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Federal General Common Law of Employment

Fashioning a General Common Law for Employment in an Age of Statutes

Michael C. Harper1
The clarion yet careful pronouncement of Erie, “There is no federal general common law,”
opened the way to what, for want of a better term, we may call specialized federal common
law.”
Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie

and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 382,
405 (1964)

[W]hen we have concluded that Congress intended terms … to be understood in light of agency
law, we have relied on the general common law of agency, rather than on the law of any
particular State, to give meaning to these terms.
Community for Creative Non Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989) (Marshall, J., for a
unanimous Court)
In “cases of division of opinion a choice had to be made and naturally we chose the view we
thought was right”. In judging what was “right”, a preponderating balance of authority would
normally be given weight, as it no doubt would generally weigh with courts, but is has not been
thought to be conclusive.
Herbert Wechsler, 1966 Annual Report of the Director, American Law Institute
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Professor of Law and Barreca Labor Relations Scholar, Boston University School of Law (BUSL). I thank
participants in the BUSL workshop for their comments.
This article was inspired by my work as a Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement Third of
Employment Law. The views expressed in this article, however, are those of the author alone; they have not been
endorsed by the ALI or by the other Reporters.
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I.
Introduction
Judge Friendly’s eloquent and cogent defense of Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2 highlighted the post Erie flowering of a new Court crafted federal
common law, “truly uniform,” and, unlike the rejected federal general common law of Justice
Story,3 “binding in every forum” and “therefore … predictable and useful as its predecessor …
was not.”4 In the half century since Judge Friendly’s praise, this specialized and binding federal
common law has blossomed further with expanding federal legislation and corresponding
additional praise.5 Neither Justice Brandeis nor his former clerk Judge Friendly nor other
subsequent commentators, however, seem to have fully appreciated the continuing post Erie
role of the Court in the multi jurisdictional enterprise of developing, if not discovering,6 a best
or most enlightened general common law for all in an age of statutes. This post Erie role derives
2

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
In Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (Pet. 16) 1 (1842), Justice Story embraced the existence of a “true” general commercial
law, by holding that federal courts should apply their own understanding of this general commercial law rather
than the understanding expressed in state court decisions in applicable jurisdictions. Id. at 19 20.
4
Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 382, 405 (1964).
5
See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 585 (2006);
Martha Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1986); Thomas Merrill, The
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts., 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1985); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on
Erie the Thread, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1682 (1974).
6
“[I]t will hardly be contended that the decisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of
what the laws are, and are not, of themselves, laws.” Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (Story, J., for the
Court). For Justice Story, there surely was at least “true” law “governing negotiable instruments” to be discovered,
rather than created for particular times and nations. In his opinion in Swift, id. at 9, Justice Story quotes Cicero:
“Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore una
eadeque lex obtinebit.” (“There will not be one law of Rome and another of Athens; there will not be one law now
and another after this; but among all nations, and in every time, one and the same law will hold.”)
The notion of a true general common law, distinct from local law, for all courts, including federal courts,
to labor to determine, was only of Justice Story’s time, or even of an earlier time, not of Story’s creation. The Swift
decision “summed up prior attitudes and expressions in cases that had come before this court and lower federal
courts for at least thirty years, at law as well as in equity. The short of it is that the doctrine was congenial to the
jurisprudential climate of the time.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 03 (1945). See generally
William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine
Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513 (1984). For a thorough presentation of the historical context, see Stewart Jay,
Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One and Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 and 1231 (1985).
Justice Story’s “classical English view” of judicial decisions as only the evidence of a true common law for
judges to discover or determine was being rejected by many even during the period in which Swift was decided
and would lose further support over the course of the nineteenth century. See Kempin, Precedent and Stare
Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 Am. J. Legal Hist. 28, 31 32, 36 (1959). See also, Morton Horowitz, The
Transformation of American Law 1780 1860, at 1 30 (1977).
3
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in large part from the Court’s delegated authority to make law by filling gaps in federal statutes.
This law making authority, though confined by the words, structure, and purposes of the
statutes, rather than just by precedent, both draws on and potentially influences state common
law. It thus enables the Court not only to render statutory constructions that command all
courts, but also to participate in a general common law making process of persuasion, not
unlike that in which the federal courts participated during the Swift v. Tyson regime.
The Court’s potential participation in the general common law making process generally
has been ignored by legal commentators, perhaps because of a resistance to the recognition of
statutory construction as akin to the law making of common law judges. The Court, however,
has understood fully the relevance of the general common law to its law making under federal
statutes. For instance, in a series of decisions interpreting the scope of the employment
relationship reached by various federal regulatory statutes, including the federal Copyright Act
treated in Community for Creative Non Violence v. Reid, 7 the Court has explicitly acknowledged
its participation in the general common law making process.8 In this series of decisions, the
Court has claimed to base its interpretation of the scope of the employment relationship on a
general common law of agency, drawn in part from the Restatement Second of Agency of the
American Law Institute (ALI), rather than the law set by a particular state.9 The Court’s
interpretations set law binding in state courts for the meaning of the federal statutes; but like
the federal general common law of the Swift era, the Court’s interpretations also can persuade,
though not command, state courts to adjust their own particular understandings of the
common law of agency.
The Court’s capacity to participate in the general common law making process of course
is not confined to cases defining the employment relationship under the general law of agency.
The Court generally assumes that when a statute uses without the inclusion of any meaningful
definition terms and phrases drawn from the common law, Congress intended that these terms
7

490 U.S. 730 (1989).
See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444 445 (2003); National Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318, 322 323 (1974); NLRB v.
United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968).
9
See TAN xxx infra.
8
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and phrases be interpreted in accord with that law.10 The determination of the common law to
be incorporated into such statutes affords the Court the opportunity to influence the
development of the general common law.11 Moreover, some common law type issues may be
presented by federal statutes even in the absence of the express use of common law
terminology.12 How state courts resolve such issues under their common law could be
influenced by the Court’s resolution of the analogous issues under the federal statutes.13
10

See, e.g., See Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 402 (2003) (“Absent contrary direction from
Congress, we begin our interpretation of statutory language with the general presumption that a statutory term has its
common law meaning.”); Evan v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259 (1991) (“It is a familiar “maxim that a statutory
term is general presumed to have its common law meaning.” (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592
(1990)); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957) (“where a federal criminal statute uses a common law
term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the general practice is to give that term its common-law
meaning”) (dicta).
11
For instance, the Court in Scheidler, supra, based in part on its understanding of the common law’s definition of
extortion, interpreted the federal Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, to apply only when an actor through coercion
acquires, rather than merely deprives another of a property right. 537 U.S. at 402 404. In Scheidler, therefore, the
Court held that anti abortion protestors did not violate the Hobbs Act by coercively closing an abortion clinic. Id. at
397. This interpretation of the common law definition of extortion could discourage judicial acceptance of a more
expansive common law definition. Cf. People v. Robey, 2009 WL 3208689 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th Dist. 2009) (citing
Sheidler in explanation of California’s statutory requirement that property be exchanged as an element of crime of
extortion); Matthew T. Grady, Extortion May No Longer Mean Extortion After Scheidler v. National Organization
for Women, Inc., 81 N.D. L. Rev. 33 (2005) (contending that the Scheidler decision weakens the intended force of
the Hobbs Act).
In Evan, supra, the Court held that an affirmative act of inducement by a public official is not an element
of extortion “under color of official right,” as prohibited by the Hobbs Act. Id. at 256. The holding was based in part
on the Court’s determination that a demand or request by the public official “was not an element of the offense”
at common law. Id. at 259. Justice Thomas in dissent contended that the majority misstated the common law by
failing to require the taking to be under a false pretense of official right. Id. at 278, 279 280. He claimed the
majority thereby conflated the common law crimes of extortion and bribery. Id. at 283 284. Whether or not Justice
Thomas was correct, the majority’s interpretation of the relevant common law definition clearly could influence
how states apply their own law.
12
See, e.g., Metro North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 438 443 (1997) (holding that an
employee alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot recover under the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act (FELA) for pre symptomatic medical monitoring costs); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994)
(setting conditions for an employee’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress under the FELA); Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983) (setting culpability standards for punitive damages in an action under § 1983). See
also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (setting conditions for the issuance of permanent
injunctions under the Patent Act).
13

Buckley, supra, provides a good example, as several state supreme courts seem to have been influenced by its
holding and reasoning. See, e.g., Hinton ex rel, Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So.2d 827, 830 32 (Ala. 2001); Menry
v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 696 (Mich.2005); see also Victor E. Schwartz, Cary Silverman, and Christopher
E. Appel, The Supreme Court’s Common Law Approach to Excessive Punitive Damage Awards: A Guide for the
Development of State Law, 60 S.C. L. Rev. 881, 883, 912 914 (2009). eBay, supra, ultimately may provide another
example. See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden, Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The
Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 203, 207 215 and n.51 (2012) (contending that the Court’s
formulation of conditions for the issuance of permanent injunctions departed significantly from traditional
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Furthermore, the federal courts’ authority to make “specialized federal common law” binding
on all courts within defined domains, such as maritime law,14 the law governing controversies
between states,15 or the law governing the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements,16
also enables the Court concomitantly to suggest or support general doctrinal developments
that potentially could be used by state courts in their discretion to formulate their own
common law.17

equitable principles and has started to affect the issuance of injunctions in state as well as federal courts).
On the other hand, thus far neither Gottshall nor Smith seem to have influenced state courts significantly.
But cf. AALAR, Ltd., Inc. v. Francis, 716 So. 2d 1141, 1147 (Ala. 1998) (noting “current state of Alabama law is
consistent with the “zone of danger” test discussed in Gottshall”); Winters v. Greeley, 189 Ill. App. 3d 590, 596, 545
N.E.2d 422, 426 (1989) (citing Smith for the proposition that punitive damages can be awarded on the same
threshold culpability standard set for compensatory damages).
14
The federal courts’ authority to develop a specialized federal maritime common law derives from the grant of
jurisdiction over “admiralty and maritime” cases in Article III, section 2, U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360 361 (1959) (the constitutional grant empowers the federal
courts to continue the development of maritime law).
15
On the same day it decided Erie the Court announced, in another opinion by Justice Brandeis, that “federal
common law” would continue to govern interstate disputes such as the equitable apportionment of interstate
waters or interstate boundaries. See Hinderlider v. La Plata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). This
federal common law was originally developed in suits between states under the original jurisdiction of the Court.
See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 496 (1922).
16
See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (inferring authority to fashion federal common
law to govern collective bargaining agreements from grant of jurisdiction in § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, over suits governed by such agreements).
17
For instance, the Court’s decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008), establishing an upper
limit of a 1:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages for maritime cases governed by federal common law,
could influence the development of state common law on punitive damages. See Victor E. Schwartz, Cary
Silverman, and Christopher E. Appel, The Supreme Court’s Common Law Approach to Excessive Punitive Damage
Awards: A Guide for the Development of State Law, 60 S.C. L. Rev. 881, 883, 914 915 (2009) (advocating state
courts being influenced by Exxon Shipping).
Similarly, had Congress not passed comprehensive regulation of water pollution, the Court might have
influenced the common law of nuisance by use of its authority, as asserted in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
91, 107 (1972), to develop a federal common law to govern interstate water pollution disputes. But cf. City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 319 (1981) (comprehensive federal legislation displaces federal common
law governing interstate water pollution); cf. also American Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537
(2011) (federal statutes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of interstate pollution from
carbon dioxide emissions).
Even federal common law cases encouraging the enforcement of arbitration provisions in collective
bargaining agreements, e.g. Lincoln Mills, supra, (specifically enforcing agreement to arbitrate); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (arbitration awards interpreting and
applying terms of collective agreements not subject to review on the merits), supra note xx, eventually might have
encouraged the use of arbitration in cases governed by state common law had the Court not obviated such
influence by interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., to preempt state law restrictions on
agreements to arbitrate. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding preempted a state law
requiring claims brought under it to have judicial consideration).

5
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The Court’s current potential role in the general common law making process is fully
consistent with our contemporary positivist assumptions about the nature of law. It is not
premised, as apparently was Justice Story’s opinion in Swift v. Tyson,18 on the assumption that
something called law exists independently of rules set by human agents through sovereign
authority.19 The Court’s potential role in the modern general common law making process is
like that of state supreme courts, which accept their participation in an ongoing interactive
process of development and refinement in response both to better understanding and analysis
of the impact of current doctrine and also to social and political change.20
The Court’s continuing role in general common law making is reason for another round
of praise, beyond that offered by Judge Friendly, for the three quarter century old decision in
Erie. Not only does Erie ensure the application of uniform substantive law between federal and
state courts in the same jurisdiction, but it does so without restricting Congress from
empowering, through statutory delegation, an elite federal judiciary’s participation in the
process of developing a common law, which may, but does not have to, become more uniform
between jurisdictions21 as it becomes more refined and adapted to an increasingly integrated
national society and polity.

Further examples of the potential influence of specialized federal common law on state common law
could be drawn from specialized federal common law fashioned to protect the rights and obligations of the United
States. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (“The rights and duties of the United
states on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than local law.”); Priebe & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947) (federal common law to be used to construe federal government contracts;
it “is customary, where Congress has not adopted a different standard, to apply to the construction of government
contracts the principles of general contract law”).
18
See note x supra.
19
“But law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it.
The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the common law
generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it may have been
in England or anywhere else. . .The authority and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice adopted by
the State as its own (whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court) should utter the last word.” Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). Or as famously expressed more colorfully by Justice Holmes, “[t]he
common law is not some brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi
sovereign that can be identified. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917).
20
For what remains in my view, a classic description of judicial law making, see Edward H. Levi, An Introduction To
Legal Reasoning, 15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501 (1948). See also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law,
(Harvard 1988), especially chapters 4 and 7 for how common law develops in response to social change.
21
As stated by Chief Justice Marshall, “even in cases where the decisions of the Supreme Court are not to be
considered an authority except in the courts of the United States, some advantage may be derived from their
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The Court’s participation in the general common law making process can proceed in at
least as many directions as those that can be taken by any common law making court. For
instance, the Court can confirm as general common law the unanimous, nearly unanimous, or
predominant majority rule laid down by the various states. Alternatively, the Court can purport
to follow such a rule as the general common law rule, even as it subtly, or perhaps not so
subtly, refines or modifies that rule in its restatement for federal law.22 As modern lawyers, we
should understand that any application of legal doctrine to the particular facts of a case affects
the meaning of that doctrine, if only to an imperceptible and marginal extent.23 More
significantly, the Court can consider and expressly reject the adequacy of general common law
doctrine, and then offer in its place alternative doctrine to fill the interstices and advance the
purposes of the federal statute it is interpreting. While this alternative doctrine is unlikely to
influence state common law immediately, it nonetheless can plant a seed that if sufficiently
hardy may result eventually in spreading vines throughout the common law. Finally, the Court
potentially may influence common law developments by treating without any direct reference
to the common law an issue under a federal statute that is analogous to a common law issue.
However the Court proceeds, its participation in this general common law making
promises the benefits of federalism without the costs of centralization. State courts when
fashioning their own responses to common law issues do not have to follow the Court’s lead.
being known. It is certainly to be wished that independent tribunals having concurrent jurisdiction over the same
subject should concur in the principles on which they determine the cases coming before them. This concurrence
can be obtained … by that mutual respect which will probably be inspired by a knowledge of the grounds on which
their judgments respectively stand.” Letter to Congress Feb. 7, 1817, reprinted in 2 W. Crosskey, Politics and the
Constitution in the History of the United States 1246 (1953). For discussions of how American law became more
uniform in the era of Swift during the pre Civil War period, see e.g., Randall Bridwell & Ralph U. Whitten, The
Constitution and the Common Law 87 97 (1977) (discussing coexistence of local and a more uniform general
commercial law); William Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The
Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV.L.REV. 1513 (1984) (demonstrating how federal and state courts created a
uniform body of marine insurance law).
22
Cf., e.g., McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (modifying, without direct
acknowledgement, the rule of negligence to apply to manufacturers without privity with an injured purchaser).
23
See, e.g., Levi, supra, 502 503 (“the determination of similarity or difference is the function of each judge. Where
case law is considered, and there is no statute, he is not bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the
prior judge even in the controlling case. . . . The rules change as the rules are applied. More important, the rules
aise out of a process which, while comparing fact situations, creates the rules and then applies them.”) At least we
are realistic enough to recognize that courts act as lawmakers within set doctrinal boundaries. See, e.g. Joseph Raz,
The Authority of Law 197 (1979) (“within the admitted boundaries of their lawmaking powers courts act and
should act just as legislators do, namely, they should adopt those rules which they judge best”).
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They have no incentive to do so beyond the persuasiveness of the Court’s resolution of issues.
State court judges can still distinguish themselves and their states with different creative
responses that better express their states’ values.
The Court’s potential contemporary role in the general common law making process can
be well highlighted through examination of the Court’s treatment of several common law issues
on which the Court has or could make important contributions to employment law. The
richness of employment law as a source of examples of types of federal influence on the
general common law should not be surprising. Employment law consists of a mosaic of federal
and non preempted state statutes laid over a range of common law agency, tort, and contract
doctrine relevant to the employment relationship.
In each of the examples I present, ALI Restatements, and especially the Restatement
Third of Employment Law (RTEL), play a prominent role. This is not a coincidence. First,
Restatements provide an alternative basis from which to commence a search for a better
common law in an age shorn of Justice Story’s nineteenth century belief that there is some true
law that judicial and other sovereign decisions only evidence. As Herbert Wechsler stated
almost a half century ago, Restatements do so not only by purporting to aggregate and classify
the variant doctrinal choices of the states, but also by determining which of those choices is
“right” or best for the issues it addresses.24 Thus, while Restatements do not represent an
attempt to state the true general common law, they do represent an attempt to state the best
common law, considering the collective efforts of many decision makers in many jurisdictions.
Second, all of the examples of federal participation in the general common law making
process highlighted in this article are at least cited and in some cases relied upon in the
Restatement Third of Employment Law. The Restatement Third of Employment Law’s partial
reliance on federal decisions itself illustrates how such decisions can play a role in the
development of general common law.25

24

See the quote from Professor Wechsler’s annual director’s report on page x supra.
As stated in the opening footnote, the author served as one of the Reporters for the Restatement Third of
Employment Law (RTEL). He was the principal author of two Chapters of the RTEL relevant to this article, Chapter
25
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I begin in Part II with consideration of the Court’s decisions that invoke and formulate
the general common law of agency to define the scope of the employment relationships for
various federal regulatory statutes. This Part has two sections. In the first, I describe the Court’s
participation in the formulation of common law doctrine distinguishing employees from
independent contractors, and stress how the Court might sharpen that doctrine, without
overruling its prior decisions, by adoption of doctrinal refinements suggested by the
Restatement Third of Employment Law.26 Such adoption, I suggest, might occur through review
of decisions of a federal agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which itself
participates in the general common law making process through its judicially reviewed law
making authority. 27
In the second section of Part II, I consider the Court’s treatment, through review of an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guideline, of another limitation on the
scope of the employment relationship, that which excludes controlling owners of employing
entities from the class of employees protected by employment regulatory statutes. I contend
that this treatment, though purportedly based on traditional common law doctrine, is actually
both a departure and also a clarifying enhancement of that doctrine – an enhancement that
could be adopted by the states for purposes beyond anti discrimination law.
In Part III, I turn to an example of how the general common law making process also can
be enhanced by the Court’s consideration and rejection of general common law doctrine in
favor of new common law type doctrine as the basis for interpretation of a federal statute.28
The example is the Court’s formulation of a new rule of limited vicarious liability to govern
employer responsibility for the harassment of employees by their supervisors. The new rule,
which the Court adopted after finding current common law principles inadequate, is binding
only for federal anti discrimination statutes; it could, however, be usefully adapted by state
courts as the basis for a compromise resolution of liability issues under the common law.
One, which defines the employment relationship, and Chapter Four, which sets out general principles for employer
liability for harm to their employees.
26
See TAN xxx xxx infra.
27
See TAN xxx xxx infra.
28
See TAN xxx xxx infra.
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Part IV presents an example of how the Court’s articulation of doctrine to govern a
federal statute, even without reference to general common law precedent, may provide
support for state judicial, as well as statutory, doctrinal innovations on common law issues.29
The example is the Court’s definition of the employer actions that may constitute prohibited
retaliation under the federal anti discrimination in employment laws. State courts, though of
course not compelled to adopt this doctrine for law protecting employees asserting state based
rights or discharging public duties, might sensibly borrow the doctrine in the development of
their common law.
Finally in Part V, through another example of the Court’s overt modification of a
common law rule, I highlight a limitation on the role of statutory interpretation in the general
common law making process. The example is the Court’s interpretation of Title VII to modify
what it considered to be the common law rule for the imputation to an employer of vicarious
liability for punitive damages for the acts of an agent. I argue that the Court’s modification
cannot provide a general common law principle because rules for the imputation of punitive
damages must vary with the policy balance made for various statutory and common law cause
of actions.
In a brief conclusion I note how the current general common lawmaking process can be
an interactive one that not only enables federal default rules to influence state common law,
but also allows state law developments to influence modifications in federal common law
default rules.

29

See TAN xxx xxx infra.
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II.
The General Common Law Definition of Employee
A. Distinguishing independent contractors –
In Community for Creative Non Violence v. Reid30 the Court considered competing claims to
ownership of a copyright for a sculpture from the sculptor and from the nonprofit
unincorporated association that had commissioned the sculpture.31 Ownership under the
Copyright Act of 197632 turned on whether the sculpture was among those “works made for
hire”33 “prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment”34 or rather was
made by a commissioned independent contractor. After noting the Copyright Act “nowhere
defines the terms “employee” or “scope of employment”,” the Court concluded that Congress
intended these terms to be defined by common law agency doctrine.35 The Court based this
conclusion primarily on what it described as a “well established” rule that “w]here Congress
uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under … the common law, a court must
infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established
meaning of these terms.” 36 The Court cited several of its past decisions37 that had used the
common law of agency to define an employment relationship for purposes of determining
liability under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA),38 which requires a plaintiff to be
employed by a railroad from which he or she seeks recovery.39 Referring to these cases, the
30

490 U.S. 730 (1989).
The Community for Creative Non Violence was primarily concerned with reducing homelessness and orally
commissioned the statute to “dramatize the plight of the homeless.” Id. at 732.
32
17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
33
17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
34
17 U.S.C. § 101(1).
35
490 U.S. at 738.
36
Id. at 739, quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981). The Court in Amax Coal treated the
regulation of union welfare funds as trusts under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141
197. The Court held that Congress must have intended to incorporate into the LMRA commonly accepted
equitable principles, including the proposition that trustees owe complete duties of loyalty to the beneficiaries of
trusts. Id. To support this as a well established principle of equity, the Court relied in part on the Restatement
Second of Trusts. Id.
37
Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318, 322 323 (1974); Baker v. Texas & Pacific Co., 359 U.S. 227, 228
(1959); Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94 (1915).
38
45 U.S.C. §§ 51 60.
39
45 U.S.C. § 51.
31
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Court stated that “when we have concluded that Congress intended terms such as “employee,”
“employer,” and “scope of employment to be understood in light of agency law, we have relied
on the general common law of agency, rather than on the law of any particular State, to give
meaning to these terms … . Establishment of a federal rule of agency, rather than reliance on
state agency law, is particularly appropriate here given the Act’s express objective of creating
national, uniform copyright law by broadly pre empting state statutory and common law
copyright protection.”40
After confirming through analysis of the structure and history of the Copyright Act that
Congress intended the use of the common law of agency to define “employee” under the Act,41
the Court proceeded to define federal agency common law by consideration of “the general
common law of agency” as expressed in the Restatement Second of Agency and in prior
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals decisions defining the employment relationship for
purposes of numerous federal statutes, including the FELA.42 In its description of the common
law, the Court seemed to accept the structure of § 220 of the Restatement Second of Agency,
which defines in its first section an employee43 as “a person employed to perform services in
the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services is subject to the other’s control or right to control,” but then in its second section lists
ten “matters of fact, among others” which are to be “considered” in “determining whether one
acting for another is a servant [employee] or an independent contractor.”44 Similarly, the Court
40

490 U.S at 740.
Id. at 741 50.
42
Id. at 751.
43
Section 220 uses the traditional common law terminology of servant and master, rather than the current
employee and employer terms used by both the Restatement Third of Agency and the Restatement Third of
Employment Law.
44
The ten § 220(2) “matters of fact” to be “considered” are:
41

“(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the
direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
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stated that in determining employee status under the common law of agency, it would
“consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished,” but then listed “other factors relevant to this inquiry.”45 The Court drew a list of
twelve other factors, not only from the second subsection of § 220, but also from prior federal
cases; and just as its statement of the primary test differed somewhat from that of § 220, so did
its list of relevant factors.46
Both the Court’s reliance on and also its refinement of § 220 of the Restatement Second of
Agency are significant. Together they reflect the Court’s active participation in the general
common law making process. The Court’s refinement potentially could influence the
development of the common law in state courts, even as it set uniform law for purposes of the
federal Copyright Act. Most significantly, the Court expanded on the second factor in § 220(2)
“whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business” – with
several additional factors relevant to determining whether the putative employee performed
the disputed work as part of an independent business. The additional factors include: “the
location of the work;” “whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to
the hired party;” “the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work;”

(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the places of work for
the person doing work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.”
45

490 U.S. at 751 752.
The Court’s list included: “the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work;
the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits;
and the tax treatment of the hired party.” Id.
46
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and “the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants.”47 These factors, in addition to one
repeating a consideration listed in § 220 (2) – whether the hiring party or the hired party is the
source of the instrumentalities or tools – are all directly relevant to the question of whether the
work was performed as part of an independent business through which the hired party could
enhance his or her returns without proportionately enhancing those of the employer.
Consideration of these factors can indicate that there is an employment relationship in the
absence of the hiring party’s control over the details of the hired party’s work, on the one hand,
or that there is not an employment relationship even when the hiring party does have a right to
control some of the details of the work product, on the other hand.
Indeed, the Court’s application of its multi factor test in Community for Creative Non
Violence itself illustrated how the Court’s list of factors shifted the focus from the hiring party’s
right to control the details of the hired party’s work to whether the hired party did the work as
part of an independent business. The Court noted that members of the Community for
Creative Non Violence (CCNV) “directed enough of Reid’s work to ensure that he produced a
sculpture that met their specifications. But the extent of control the hiring party exercises over
the details of the product is not dispositive.”48 Instead, the Court stated, other factors indicate
the sculptor, Reid, was an independent contractor. Those factors included his supply of “his
own tools,” his use of “his own studio,” his “absolute freedom to decide when and how long to
work” and to decide whether to do other projects for CCNV, and “his total discretion in hiring
and paying assistants.”49 All of these considerations indicated how Reid could enhance earnings
from his work by making independent business decisions about the use and allocation of his
human capital, the labor of others, and other resources, like tools and his studio, in which he
had invested.
The Court’s decision in Community for Creative Non Violence could have been
influenced by the equitable appeal of the sculptor’s claim of copyright ownership; under
intellectual property law, unlike under most employment law, employment status is not
47

Id.
Id. at 752.
49
Id. at 752 753.
48
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generally sought by workers.50 A few terms later, in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v.
Darden,51 however, the Court confirmed that it had reformulated common law doctrine to
serve as a federal general common law or default principle for distinguishing independent
contractors from employees. Darden presented the question of whether an insurance salesman
who had pledged to sell only Nationwide policies had been an employee of Nationwide under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). If Darden, the salesman, had been an
employee, he would have been able to enforce the provisions of ERISA to protect his accrued
benefits in Nationwide’s deferred compensation plans made available to him while he
represented Nationwide. If he had been an independent contractor, he would not have been
able to invoke ERISA. The Court noted that ERISA’s definition of “employee” as “any individual
employed by an employer” is “completely circular and explains nothing.”52 Without any further
direction from Congress, the Court concluded it should follow the direction it took in
Community for Creative Non Violence: “adopt a common law test for determining who qualifies
as an “employee”.”53 The Darden Court then quoted the passage from Community for Creative
Non Violence setting out this test, followed by a comparative citation to § 202(2) and to an
Internal Revenue Service Ruling “setting forth 20 factors as guides in determining whether an
individual qualifies as a common law “employee” in various tax law contexts.”54
The Darden Court, however, did not further refine its federal common law default test
by applying it to the facts of the case, choosing instead to remand the case to the Court of
Appeals to do so.55 The Court in Darden also declined to sharpen its formulation of the

50

This also may be true when a worker seeks to bring a tort action for an injury free of a workers’ compensation
system that provides an exclusive remedy against the worker’s employer.
51
503 U.S. 318 (1992).
52
Id. at 323.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 323 24. The Court cited Rev. Rul. 87 41, 1987 1 Cum. Bull. 296, 298 299.
55
503 U.S. at 328. The Court noted that the Court of Appeals had stated in dicta that “Darden most probably would
not qualify as an employee” under traditional agency law principles.” Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d
701, 705 (1986). In reaching its tentative judgment, the Court of Appeals relied on factors that would be relevant
to determining whether Darden operated an independent business despite his exclusive representation of
Nationwide. These factors included his freedom “to exercise his independent judgment as to the time, place, and
manner of selling insurance and servicing policy holders,” and to hire and fire clerical employees without securing
Nationwide’s approval, as well as his ownership of his building, his furniture and his automobile used for sales, and
his payment of his clerical staff and other expenses out of his commissions. Id.
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Community for Creative Non Violence federal common law default test, instead quoting form an
earlier decision determining the existence of an employment relationship under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA),56 which unhelpfully stated “all of the incidents of the relationship
must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.”57
The Community for Creative Non Violence multi factor formulation of the common law
distinction of employees from independent contractors has been cited not only in cases
applying the Copyright Act, where it commands other courts, but also in numerous decisions
applying state law, where it can only persuade state courts, in the manner of federal decisions
in the era of Swift v. Tyson.58 The citations in decisions applying state law demonstrate the
Court’s participation in the general common law making process even though the effect on the
outcome of the decisions is not clear. The fact that courts applying state law consider the
Community for Creative Non Violence federal common law formulation relevant itself indicates
that these courts could be persuaded by federal law decisions.
There are two interrelated reasons why it is difficult to determine whether state law
decisions have been affected by any differences between the Community for Creative Non
Violence Court’s federal common law formulation and that of § 220(2), including the greater
focus of the former on the hired party’s discretion to exercise independent business control.
First, precisely because they are multi factor tests that are not clearly tied to an ultimate
standard, neither the federal common law formulation nor the § 220(b) formulation constrain
or guide decision makers in difficult cases. Neither test, at least on its face, states the relative
weight that should be given to any factor or even why any particular factor is relevant. This
would not be the case if the formulations subordinated the residual factors as ways to
determine whether the hiring party had some sort of right to control the physical details or

56

NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
Id. at 258, quoted at 503 U.S. at 324. For discussion of the definition of the employment relationship under the
NLRA, see TAN xx xx infra.
58
See, e.g., Estrada v. City of Los Angeles, 218 Cal. Ap.. 4th 143, 150, 159 Cal. Rptr.3d 843, 48 (2013) (for definition
of employee under California Fair Employment and Housing Act); Bredesen v. Tennessee Judicial Selection
Comm’n, 214 S.W.3d 419, 431 (Tenn. 2007) (for definition of employee under Tennessee Human Rights Act);
Mortgage Consultants, Inc. v. Mahaney, 655 N.E.2d 493, 496 (Ind. 1995) (for definition of employee under Indiana
wage payment statute).
57
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manner and means of the hired party’s work, the factor generally stated in § 220(1) and stated
first in the Community for Creative Non Violence formulation. As explained above,59 however,
the Community for Creative Non Violence Court expressly rejected such subordination on the
facts of that case; and even the comments to § 220 acknowledge that employers may have
“very attenuated” control over their employees, providing such cogent examples as chefs in
restaurants, “ship captains and managers of great corporations,” and “skilled artisans.”60
The second reason it is difficult to trace the effect of the Court’s participation in the
general common law making process on the distinction of employees from independent
contractors is that the Court’s formulation of the federal default rule, at least to the extent it
highlights whether the hired party is operating an independent business, may better capture
than does § 220(2) how state courts actually decided many cases even before Community for
Creative Non Violence. This may be particularly true for state court decisions considering
whether a hired party is an employee, not for purposes of vicarious liability, but for purposes of
state statutes and common law fashioned, like much federal legislation, to protect
employees.61 The “right to control” test stated in § 220(1) was developed to determine
whether hiring parties should be liable for the torts of those they hire to do work for their
benefit; the incentive based rationale for making that determination based on the hiring party’s
right to control the hired parties work is obvious.62 The modern employment relationship,
however, is governed by a matrix of sometimes overlapping federal and state statutes, and
state common law doctrine, which provide greater protection to employees than to
independent contractors. It would not be surprising if the common law making process on the
state as well as the federal level has taken into account this modern reason for distinguishing
employees from independent contractors. If so, that state common law making process, even
59

See supra TAN xx.
§ 220, comment d.
61
See, e.g., Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 154 Cal. App. 4th 1, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (definition of
employee determined by California Labor Code and state common law); Whittenberg v. Graves Oil and Butane Co.,
Inc., 827 P.2d 838, 844 (N.M. App. 1991) (definition of employee determined by state workers’ compensation act);
S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dept. of Indus. Rel., 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989) (California common law determines
test for employee status).
62
For the historical derivation of the right to control test, see, e.g., Marc Linder, The Employment Relationship in
Anglo American Law: A Historical Perspective, Ch. 4 (1989); Richard Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an
Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 Berk. J. Emp. & Lab. L. 295 (2001).
60
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independently of the federal process, could have begun to stress factors relevant to whether
the hired party retains discretion to operate an independent business, with attendant risks and
rewards. Such discretion, much more than the level of the principal’s control of the physical
details of work, is relevant to the extent to which the hired party needs the protections offered
by modern regulation of the employment relationship.63
The Court could play a salutary role in accelerating this process by adopting a more
explicit reformulation of the general common law, one that is more predictable and more
constraining because it explains the ultimate purposes of the many factors listed not only in
Community for Creative Non Violence, but also in § 220(2), in the IRS Ruling cited in Darden, and
in other multi factor formulations. It could do so by purporting to state how the best decisions
applying the common law in both federal and state tribunals actually have decided cases, how
they have made relevant and organized at least the most important factors in the various lists.
Such a reformulation has in fact been offered in § 1.01 of the Restatement Third of
Employment Law. That section states that an individual renders services not as an employee
but “as an independent businessperson when the individual in his or her own interest exercises
entrepreneurial control over important business decisions, including whether to hire and where
to assign assistants, whether to purchase and where to deploy equipment, and whether and
when to serve other customers.”64 This formulation explains why most of the factors listed in

63

Actually a strong case can be made that the traditional right to control test for vicarious liability itself was used
as a factor to determine whether the hired party was operating an independent business. See Reporters’ Notes to
Comment a., § 1.01, Restatement Third of Employment Law., citing, inter alia, Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518
(1889) ; Sproul v. Hemmingway, 31 Mass. 1, 14 Pick. 1 (1833).
64
Section 1.01 states in full:
§ 1.01 General Conditions for Existence of Employment Relationship
(1) Subject to § 1.02 and § 1.03, an individual renders services as an employee of an employer if
(a) the individual acts, at least in part, to serve the interests of the employer,
(b) the employer consents to receive the individual’s services, and
(c) the employer controls the manner and means by which the individual renders his or her services or
otherwise effectively prevents the individual from rendering the services as an independent
businessperson.
(2) An individual renders services as an independent businessperson when the individual in his or her own interest
exercises entrepreneurial control over important business decisions, including whether to hire and where to assign
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multi factor tests, including control over the manner and means of work performance, are
relevant to the distinction of employees from independent contractors, at least for purposes of
regulatory and employee protection laws. The factors are relevant to whether the hired
individual retains discretion to make business decisions in the individual’s independent
interests rather than in the interests of the hiring party. Individuals who retain such discretion
may be less needful of legal protection. Although policy makers may wish to protect such
individuals as they protect employees who do not retain entrepreneurial discretion, whether to
do so presents a separate policy issue.
As suggested above,65 the Court’s application of its federal common law formulation in
Community for Creative Non Violence fits well the “entrepreneurial control” approach taken by
§ 1.01 because of its emphasis on the sculptor’s retention of discretion to produce the
commissioned sculpture at a time and in a manner that served his independent interests. The
Court could provide further support by for this approach by joining the several Courts of
Appeals66 that have accepted the National Labor Relations Board’s stress on the presence or
absence of “entrepreneurial opportunity” in determining employee status67 under the National
Labor Relations Act.68 The NLRA offers protection to engage or refrain from engaging in
collective bargaining or other concerted activity only to employees.69 It does not define
affirmatively employee, but expressly excludes from protection as an employee “any individual

assistants, whether to purchase and where to deploy equipment, and whether and when to serve other
customers.
65
See TAN xx supra.
66
See, e.g., NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The ability to operate an independent
business and develop entrepreneurial opportunities is significant in any analysis of whether an individual is an
“employee” or an “independent contractor” under the common law agency test.”); Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v.
NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. 2002) (upholding the “Board’s decision . . . to focus not upon the employer’s control
of the means and manner of the work but instead upon whether the punitive independent contractors have a
“significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss,” quoting Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 332 N.L.R.B. 1522
(2000)).
67
The seminal Board cases setting forth this doctrine are Dial A Mattress Operating Co., 326 N.L.R.B. 884 (1998)
(finding independent contractor status) and Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842 (1998) (finding employee
status). See also, e.g., St. Joseph News Press, 345 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (2005) (newspaper deliverers were like drivers in
Dial A Mattress who could “impact their own income, thereby demonstrating the entrepreneurial nature of their
employment”); Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 332 N.L.R.B. 1522 (“owner operator drivers are employees as they
have no “significant opportunity for entrepreneurial gain or loss”).
68
29 U.S.C. §§ 151 169.
69
See 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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having the status of an independent contractor,”70 a phrase it also does not define. Congress
added the express exclusion of independent contractors “to demonstrate that the usual
common law principles were the keys to [the] meaning” of employee,71 after the Court had first
defined employee more broadly “in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be
attained” by the NLRA.72 Since the addition of the exclusion, therefore, the general federal
common law distinction of employees from independent contractors is to apply to the NLRA.73
The Labor Board, whose administrative decisions are reviewed by the Courts of Appeals,74
serves the role of a lower adjudicatory tribunal in the common law making process. As part of
the federal general common law making process, the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals
may consider the Board’s rational for treating hired parties as included employees or excluded
independent contractors.75
A decision of a panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reviewing the Labor Board’s treatment of FedEx delivery drivers as employees76 demonstrates
how a federal court, and ultimately the Supreme Court, could influence the general common
law distinction of independent contractors. The majority on the panel lauded the Board’s shift
of emphasis “away from the unwieldy control inquiry in favor of a more accurate proxy” of

70

29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325 (1992).
72
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944).
73
The Court accepted this application in NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
74
See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) and (f).
75
Courts are to review Labor Board law making in formal adjudicatory decisions under the deferential standards
set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 43 (1984). See generally Michael
C. Harper, Judicial Control of the National Labor Relations Board’s Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron and Brand X,
89 B .U. L. Rev. 189 (2009). However, the Court’s determination in NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 331 U.S. at 256,
that Congress intended the Board to “apply general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and
independent contractors,” places the distinction of independent contractors outside the Board’s discretion and
expertise. See
NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., Inc., supra, at 1096 (“the NLRB’s decision cannot be upheld if its “application of the law
to the facts overlooked accepted principles of the law of agency … . This is because “a determination of pure
agency law involve[s] no special administrative expertise that a court does not possess”,” quoting United Ins. Co.,
390 U.S. at 260)). Further, the Court’s suggestion in Community for Creative Non Violence and Darden that a
general federal common law default rule should govern the definition of employee under all federal statutes
seems to indicate that Board doctrine that accurately captures this definition for the NLRA should also capture the
doctrine for other federal laws.
76
FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
71
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whether there is “significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.”77 The court asserted
that “while all the considerations at common law remain in play, an important animating
principle by which to evaluate those factors in cases where some factors cut one way and some
the other is whether the position presents the opportunities and risks inherent in
entrepreneurialism.”78 The court proceeded with that evaluation, finding the drivers’
entrepreneurial status to be supported by their right to assign their routes to others without
FedEx approval, by their ownership of and authority to use their trucks for other purposes
when not required to be in use for FedEx, by FedEx’s allowance of multiple routes, and by the
drivers’ authority to hire and negotiate the pay and benefits of subordinate and substitute
drivers.79
The court’s conclusion that the FedEx drivers did retain significant entrepreneurial
opportunities may have confused the drivers’ theoretical opportunities with the actual reality
of their status. The court’s conclusion conflicted with the factual findings of the Board’s
Regional Director that the drivers actually had little opportunity to influence their income from
FedEx through entrepreneurial ingenuity because the terminal manager determined how many
deliveries they made, because FedEx could reconfigure their routes unilaterally, and because
FedEx shielded the drivers from loss from unexpected expenses such as truck repairs and fuel
price increases by means of special payments.80 Moreover, the Regional Director had excluded
the few multi route drivers from coverage, no drivers seemed to use their trucks, which had to
carry large FedEx logos, for other business purposes, few seemed ever to hire their own
substitute drivers, and none seemed to have been able to sell routes for a profit given FedEx’s
reconfiguration of old routes and grant of new routes without charge.81 Right or wrong,
however, the decision turned on the entrepreneurial opportunity formulation of the common

77

Id. at 497.
Id. See also the court’s assertion that it has “retained the common law test (as is required by the Court’s decision
in United Insurance), but merely “shift[ed our] emphasis to entrepreneurialism,” using this “emphasis” to evaluate
common law factors such as whether the contractor “supplies his own equipment.”” Id. at 503.
79
Id. at 498 500.
80
Regional Director’s Decision at 37, 2006 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 264 at *56 *57.
81
563 at 504, 510 516 (dissenting opinion of Judge Garland).
78
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law test. As Judge Garland argued in his dissent,82 applying a traditionally framed right to
control common law test would have required the court to take into account facts reflecting
the company’s close control of the drivers’ actual service, and thus would have supported a
finding of employee status.83 The panel’s embrace of the Board’s entrepreneurial opportunity
emphasis, even in a decision reversing the Board, demonstrates how reformulation of federal
common law doctrine potentially could influence the general development of the common law
of agency.
The Court’s willingness to participate in the general common law making process on the
independent contractor issue suggests that such a reformulation, perhaps through adoption of
a test like that articulated in § 1.01 of the Restatement Third of Employment Law, is possible.
Supreme Court acceptance of an entrepreneurial control test as a refinement of the default
federal common law test for distinguishing employees from independent contractors of course
would not dictate a change in the common law test chosen by the various states. However, it
could influence state courts that viewed the entrepreneurial control test as more suited for
employment regulation and more predictable than the open ended, multi factor right to
control tests currently cited.84
B. Distinguishing employer agents –
The Court already has approved, apparently as general federal common law, a sharper
doctrinal departure from the traditional common law of agency governing vicarious liability
than is the entrepreneurial control or opportunities test for independent contractors. Citing
82

Id. at 510 512.
Judge Garland noted that “the court reject[ed] the import of the following requirements imposed by FedEx: that
drivers wear a recognizable uniform; that vehicles be of a particular color and size range; that trucks display the
Fed Ex logo in a size larger than Department of Transportation regulations require; that drivers complete a driving
course if they do not have prior training; that drivers submit to two customer service rides per year to audit their
performance; and that a truck and driver be available for deliveries every Tuesday through Saturday.” Id. at 511.
84
At least one state court has directly considered the Board’s “entrepreneurial opportunity” test in making a
determination of whether delivery drivers were employees or rather independent contractors under a state
employment regulatory statute. See Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 154 Cal.App.4th 1, 12, 64
Cal.Rptr.3d 327, 337 (2007) (drivers were employees in part because they were “not engaged in a separate
profession or business” and were not given a “true entrepreneurial opportunity”). The Estrada court seems to
have assumed California state law and federal law were both relevant to a general common law definition of
employee, as it took into account and distinguished federal cases, including those reviewing Labor Board decisions,
see id. at 13 n.11,
83
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Darden for a presumption that Congress intended a common law test to govern the meaning of
employee under federal statutes, the Court, in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v.
Wells,85 held it was “persuaded by the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] EEOC’s
focus on the common law touchstone of control” to determine “whether a shareholder director
is an employee”86 or rather an employer for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA).87 The shareholder directors in Clackamas were “four physicians actively engaged in
medical practice” in a “professional corporation.”88 If the physicians were not employees of the
corporation, not only would they not be protected by the ADA, but also their professional
corporation would not employ the minimum number of employees necessary to satisfy the
conditions for ADA coverage,89 and a discharged bookkeeper could not make her ADA claim of
disability discrimination.
Agreeing with the approach taken in the EEOC’s Compliance Manual, the Court asserted
that the common law right to control test for distinguishing independent contractors also
should be the basis for answering the “question of when partners, officers, members of boards
of directors, and major shareholders qualify as employees.”90 The Court also expressed
agreement with six specific factors listed in the EEOC’s Compliance Manual. Each of these
factors is relevant to whether the disputed individuals have sufficient control of the business or
part of the business to make decisions in their own economic interests free of control or
85

538 U.S. 440, 444 447 (2003).
Id. at 449.
87
42 U.S.C. § 12101. The definition of the term employee in the ADA, like the definition in ERISA, is circular: an
“employee” under the ADA is “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4).
88
538 U.S. at 441.
89
Section 101(5) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5), defines a covered employer as “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year.” The ADA’s definition of employee is typically circular: “An individual
employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5).
90
538 U.S. at 448. The Court did not give deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to the EEOC’s Compliance Manual. The Court’s failure to cite Chevron was
consistent with the Court’s later explanation that “[d]eference in accordance with Chevron … is warranted only
‘when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law.” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 56 (2006) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 227
(2001).) Although the EEOC does have authority to promulgate formal legislative rules interpreting the ADA, see
42 U.S.C. § 12116, the Compliance Manual was not promulgated pursuant to that authority. In review of the
Manual, the Clackamas Court thus instead relied on Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 323 (1944), see 538 U.S. at 449, an
older precedent requiring only consideration of the agency’s “power to persuade.” 323 U.S at 340.
86
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supervision of others.91 After briefly discussing the facts of the case, the Court remanded for
application of the EEOC’s standard.92
The EEOC approach approved by the Court in Clackamas is not that taken by the traditional
common law to determine corporate liability for the torts of major shareholders serving in
executive positions. There is no common law doctrine exempting corporate employers from
liability for the torts of such shareholders if the torts are committed in the course of their
service and within the terms of their service to the corporation.93 The Restatement Second of
Agency states that “fully employed but highly placed employees of a corporation, such as
presidents and general managers, are not less servants because they are not controlled in their
day to day work by other human beings. Their physical activities are controlled by their sense
of obligation to devote their time and energies to the interests of the enterprise.”94 Modern
partnership law also imposes liability on the partnership for the torts of any partner committed
91

The six factors are:
“Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and regulations of the
individual’s work
“Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the individual’s work
“Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization
“Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the organization
“Whether the parties intended that the individual is able to influence the organization
“Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization.”
EEOC Compliance Manual § 605:0009.
Citing its earlier quotation of United Insurance in Darden, see note xx supra, the Court also iterated that
the line dividing employees from employers, like the line dividing independent contractors, cannot be drawn by
the use of a formula or a single set of factors, and thus agreed with the EEOC that the six factors need not “be
treated as “exhaustive”.” 538 U.S. at 455 n.10.
92
538 U.S. at 451. The Court cited as apparently supportive of employer status District Court findings that the
doctor shareholders “control the operation of their clinic, they share the profits, and they are personally liable for
malpractice claims.” Id. In a footnote, however, the Court also noted that “the record indicates that the four
director shareholders receive salaries, that they must comply with the standards established by the clinic, and that
they report to a personnel manager.” Id. at n.11.
93
Indeed, modern decisions finding no preclusion by a workers’ compensation law hold corporate employers
directly liable for the torts of controlling owners as alter egos of the corporation, even when the torts are for
unauthorized actions outside the scope of employment. See, e.g., Randall v. Tod Nik Audiology, Inc., 270 A.D.2d
38, 39, 704 N.Y.S.2d 228, 230 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2000) (claims for sexual assault, battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress may proceed against corporate employer when committed by “proxy” who was
President and 50 percent owner along with wife who owned other 50 percent); Sutton v. Overcash, 251 Ill. App. 3d
737, 623 N.E.2d 820 (1993) (co owner’s sexual harassment could subject employer to tort liability); Woodson v.
rowalnd, 329 N.C. 330, 337, 407 S.E.2d 222, 226 (1991) (employer’s chief executive and sole shareholder’s
intentional tort can subject employer to liability).
94
Restatement Second Agency, Ch. 7, topic 2, title B, Intro. Note at 479. See also Restatement Third of Agency §
7.07, Illustration 15.
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within the scope of the partner’s service to the corporation, regardless of the partner’s
ownership share or control of the partnership.95 The Restatement Second of Agency states that
“[w]hen one of the partners is in active management of the business or is otherwise regularly
employed in the business, he is a servant of the partnership.”96
The Court, through its approval of the EEOC’s approach, thus endorsed a new test for
distinguishing employers from employees as a default rule for federal employment regulatory
law. It did so in the manner of common law courts which may depart creatively from prior
doctrine without open acknowledgement.97 The Clackamas decision, moreover, because it
draws a sensible line, potentially can be influential in jurisdictions other than the federal
jurisdiction it controls. The independent contractor “right to control” test, especially if refined
to an entrepreneurial control or opportunities test, can be effectively adapted to a test for
distinguishing employers from employees. Individuals who can exercise entrepreneurial control
over all or part of an enterprise in their own interest are not in the same need of regulatory
protection as are the employees treated as “servants” under the common law. Both
shareholders with controlling interests in corporations and partners who control at least part of
the operations of a partnership have such discretion. Rather than ultimately being controlled,
they exercise control.
The Restatement Third of Employment Law also could support the proliferation of the
Clackamas EEOC approach. Section 1.03 of this Restatement states that “[u]nless otherwise
provided by law, an individual is not an employee of an enterprise if the individual through an
ownership interest controls all or a significant part of the enterprise.”98 This section, like §
1.01’s definition of the line distinguishing independent contractors, provides an ultimate focus
95

See, e.g., Wallan v. Rankin, 173 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1948) (applying Oregon law); In re Georgou, 145 B.R. 36 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1992) (applying Illinois Partnership Act); Wolf v. Harms, 413 S.W. 2d 204 (Mo. 1967); Eule v. Eule Motor
Sales, 34 N.J. 537, 170 A.2d 241 (1961); Treon v. Shipman & Son, 275 Pa. 246, 119 A. 74 (1992).
96
Restatement Second of Agency § 14A. See also Restatement Third of Agency § 3.16, Comment b., which states
that [p]artnership legislation providing for joint and several liability for partnership obligations is based on “each
partner [being] an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business.” The comment cites § 301 of the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act.
97
K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush on Our Law and Its Study 72 (1960); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction To Legal
Reasoning, 15 U. Chi. L.Rev. 501, 501 (1948); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 4 7 (Harvard
1988).
98
Restatement Third of Employment § 1.03.
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for a multi factor test. Elaborating the Clackamas EEOC approach, § 1.03 requires the exclusion
of individuals as employers to be based on the individuals’ ownership of the employing
enterprise.99 Even a chief executive of a publicly held corporation is a protected employee of
that corporation, subject to the control of the owners through a Board of Directors, unless the
chief executive is herself a controlling owner. Section 1.03 also clarifies that having a non
controlling equitable stake in an enterprise, even one that includes a minority vote, does not
exclude an individual who provides remunerated service to an enterprise from the class of
employees protected by economic regulatory laws. To be excluded as a controlling owner,
whether as a corporate shareholder or as a partner, an individual must have sufficient
ownership to control a significant part of the enterprise. Section 1.03 thus clarifies that the
Clackamas doctors would be excluded employers, rather than employees of their professional
corporation, if each of the four, free of the control of the other three or their managerial
delegate, could make significant decisions about his own practice, such as the allocation of his
time, the hiring or use of assistants, and the identity of patients, which would determine his
ultimate remuneration. The Clackamas doctors, however, all would be employees if each were
subject to the control of a manager or a specific set of guidelines that constrained their making
independent business decisions about their own practice that could ultimately determine their
remuneration.
Not surprisingly, the Clackamas decision already has proved influential, not only in federal
courts interpreting federal statutes, but also in courts interpreting state statutes. Federal courts
have applied the Clackamas EEOC method for distinguishing employers from the employees
covered by the other federal employment anti discrimination statutes under the aegis of the
EEOC.100 Federal courts also cite it as relevant precedent for determining employee status
99

The EEOC Compliance Manuel, see note xxx supra, does not directly require that anyone excluded from
employee status as an employer exercise control through ownership. Only the sixth factor directly focuses on
ownership rather than control. However, anyone who is not a controlling owner is at least potentially subject to
being terminated and constrained by corporate rules and regulations, as highlighted by the first of the factors.
100
See, e.g., Mariotti v. Mariotti Bldg. Products, Inc., 714 F.3d 761, 768 (3d Cir. 2013) (religious discrimination
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 2010 WL 2780927 (3d Cir.
2010) (sex discrimination under Title VII and Equal Pay Act); Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971 (7th Cir.
2006) Solon v. Kaplan, 398 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2005) (retaliation under Title VII); Bowers v. Ophthalmology
Group, LLP, 2012 WL 3637529 (W.D. Ky. 2012) (sex discrimination under Title VII); Simms v. Center for Correctional

26

Federal General Common Law of Employment

under other federal statutes;101 in at least one case a court did so to exclude an individual from
coverage under the EEOC test.102 Several state courts also have found Clackamas to be relevant
as a common law precedent for the interpretation of state anti discrimination or other
employee protection statutes.103
One of these state court decisions, Feldman v. Hunterdon Radiological Associates,104
rendered by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, highlights how the Supreme Court currently
may play the same role of persuasion and influence over state law that was envisaged for
federal courts in the Swift v. Tyson era. The issue in Feldman was whether a physician
radiologist and shareholder director of a professional corporation was an employee protected
by the state’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA).105 As explained by the court,
“CEPA was enacted in 1986 in response” to one of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s prior
decisions106 which had recognized “a common law cause of action for at will “employees” for
wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.”107 CEPA
codified that cause of action, in part by providing specific definitions of employee actions
protected from employer retaliation, including objection to the “improper quality of patient
Health and Policy Studies, 794 F.Supp.2d 173, 190 (D.D.C. 2011) (sexual harassment under Title VII); Puckett v.
McPhillips Shimbaum, 2010 WL 17929104 (M.D. Ala. 2010)( Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
101
See, e.g., Trustees of N.E.C.A.—IBEW Local 176 Health, Welfare, Pension, Vacation, and Training Trust Funds v.
CM Management Services Co., 2009 WL 590310 (N.D.Ill. 2009) (finding employee status for protection by the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act). Steelman v. Hirsch, 473 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 2007) (plaintiff not an
employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act because she worked to share in the future success of business rather
than for current compensation); Bell v. Atlantic Trucking Co. 108 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 74 (M.D. Fla. 2009)
(citing Clackamas as common law precedent for employee status under exemption from Federal Arbitration Act);
Nichols v. All Points Transportation Corp. of Mich., Inc., 364 F. Supp.2d 621 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (citing Clackamas as
common law precedent for employee status under Family Medical Leave Act).
102
See Pearl v. Monarch Life Insurance Co., 289 F. Supp.2d 324, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (plaintiff surgeon who
supervised own work, reported to no supervisor, and was co equal owner of enterprise with two other doctors
was not an employee under Employment Retirement Income Security Act).
103
See, e.g., Kirleis, supra note xx (Pennsylvania antidiscrimination statute); Madigan v. Webber Hosp. Assoc., 2012
WL 451098 (D. Me. 2012) (Maine antidiscrimination statute); Williams v. Kuramo Capital Management, LLC, 2012
WL 2942595 (N.Y. Sup. 2012) (New York state and city antidiscrimination statutes); Hopkins v. Duckett, 2012 WL
124842 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2012) (New Jersey antidiscrimination statute); Imperator v. Southern California
Permanente Medical Group, 2007 WL 1979041 (Ct. of App., 2d Dist., Div. 1) (Cal. Fair Employment and Housing
Act); Theroux v. Stephen Singer, DDS, PC, 21 Mass. L. Rptr. 187 (2006) (Massachusetts employment discrimination
law).
104
187 N.J. 228, 901 A.2d 322 (2006).
105
N.J.S.A. 34:19 1 to 8.
106
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
107
187 N.J. at 237.
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care” of a “licensed … health care professional.”108 Dr. Feldman claimed she was constructively
discharged by hostility from the other shareholder directors because of her strong objections to
the “deficiencies” in the care provided by one of these fellow shareholder director doctors.109
The court held, however, that her claim stated a cause of action under CEPA only if she was an
employee of the professional corporation; and to determine whether she was it would “adopt
the approach formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Clackamas.”110 The Feldman
court recognized that the Court in Clackamas for purposes of considering controlling
shareholder directors had “ultimately modulated” the common law test “drawn from section
220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency” for independent contractors.111 Nonetheless, the
Feldman court embraced this “holistic approach to the question of a shareholder director’s
employee status” for the CEPA,112 and finding Feldman’s position and power on the
professional corporation’s Board of Directors to be “at least equal to that of the other
shareholders directors,”113 held she was not a protected employee.114
The Feldman court’s adoption of the Clackamas “approach” did not dictate the result in the
case. Given the Clackmas’s Court’s decision to remand rather than itself apply the EEOC
factors,115 Clackamas can be read, more in line with the Restatement Third of Employment, to
make critical, not whether a shareholder director (or partner) has at least equal influence as
any other shareholder director (or partner), but rather whether any shareholder director has
independent discretion to operate at least part of the business in her own economic interest
free of the collective control of the others. Dr. Feldman apparently did not retain such
discretion; each doctor had to practice medicine only for the corporation and only under the
rules and regulations of the corporation, including those determining the patients to be served
and the fees to be charged and exclusively assigned to the corporation.116 Any influence Dr.
108

N.J.S.A. 34:19 3c(1).
187 N.J. at 231.
110
Id. at 232.
111
Id. 242 43.
112
Id. at 246.
113
Id. at 249.
114
Id. at 250.
115
538 U.S. at451.
116
187 N.J. at 233 34.
109
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Feldman had over the corporation depended upon her influence over the collectivity of the
other doctors, and, like each of the other doctors, she was subject in all respects to the
collectivity’s authority.117 If out of favor because of protected whistleblowing activity, Dr.
Feldman was as vulnerable to discharge and other mistreatment by that collectivity as would be
any senior manager by the collective power of a supervisory board.
Nevertheless, the Feldman court’s acceptance of the Clackamas decision as the guiding light
for purposes of its formulation of the coverage of New Jersey’s wrongful discharge law
demonstrates well how the Supreme Court’s federal law making authority can contribute to the
development of a general common law in the age of Erie and a matrix of federal and state
statutes.118 Indeed, the application of the Clackamas approach to a state statute intended to
codify a development in the state’s common law suggests that the Clackamas “modulation” of
common law also could directly influence a state’s non codified common law as well. A
creative adaption of common law doctrine for purposes of serving the goals and balance of a

117

Id. at 249.
Clackamas, especially as refined in § 1.03 of the Restatement Third of Employment Law, also might assist state
courts in their interpretation of their jurisdiction’s workers’ compensation statute. Such statutes often exempt
from their exclusive coverage assaults and other intentional torts committed directly by a human employer or by
an “alter ego” of a legal entity employer, such as a corporation. See Larson’s Workers Compensation Law, Vol. 6, §
103.01, and cases cited therein. The controlling owner formulation of § 1.03 could provide a meaningful standard
to capture how the states generally have defined and reasonably should define “alter ego.” Compare, e.g., Randall
v. Tod Nik Audiology, Inc., 270 A.D.2d 38, 704 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2000) (claims for sexual
assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress may proceed against corporate employer when
committed by possible “proxy” who was President and 50% owner along with wife who owned other 50%);
Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 337, 407 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. S. Ct. 1991) (conduct of employer’s chief executive
and sole shareholder that is “tantamount to an intentional tort” can subject employer to liability); Magiliulo v.
Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (workers’ compensation remedy not
exclusive of tort claim where assaulter of injured employee was co owner and partner), with, e.g., Eichstadt v.
Frisch’s Restaurants, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (employee must show that both ownership
and control of the corporation are in the hands of the tortfeasor); McClain v. Pactiv Corp., 360 S.C. 480, 602 S.E.2d
87 (2004) (managers who were not “dominant” corporate owners or officers are not alter egos of corporate
employer); Benson v. Goble, 1999 S.D. 38, 593 N.W.2d 402, 406 (1999) (to qualify as alter ego, employee must be
“so dominant in the corporation that he could be deemed” to be the employer under the general standard for
disregarding corporate entity); Peterson v. Rtm Mid America, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 691, 434 S.E.2d 521 (1993)
(manager of restaurant not an alter ego because not in a position of ownership or control); Daniels v. Swofford,
286 S.E.2d 582 (1982) (company president who kicked employee in leg not an alter ego). See also § 4.01, comment
b., Restatement Third of Employment.
118
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federal statute also can provide a persuasive model for developments in the common law of
state jurisdictions.119
III.
Vicarious Employer Liability for the Torts of Supervisors
The Court in Clackamas did not acknowledge that its adoption of common law doctrine
was a departure from the traditional general common law. In other significant employment law
decisions, however, the Court has acknowledged openly its creative reformulation of the
general common law of agency after assuming Congress intended common law to guide the
interpretation of a statute. Most significantly, in two separate decisions released the same
day120 and pronouncing the exact same paragraph long “holding,”121 the Court announced new
doctrine to determine employer liability under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act122 for
discriminatory harassment of employees by supervisors.123 This new doctrine, although
controlling only for Title VII and presumably other federal anti employment discrimination

119

For other examples outside employment law of Supreme Court decisions that could influence state common
law doctrine through what arguably were “modulations” of the common law in its application to the interpretation
of a federal statute, see the Court’s decisions in Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 402 (2003)
and Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259 (1991), both discussed in note 10 supra.
120
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998).
121
524 U.S. at 807; 524 U.S. at 765.
122
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
123
“An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment
created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible
employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages,
subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8 (c). The defense comprises two
necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an employer had
promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of
law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any
case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any unreasonable failure to
use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to
satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense. No affirmative defense is available,
however, when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment.” 524 U.S. at 807; 524 U.S. at 765.

30

Federal General Common Law of Employment

statutes,124 potentially could have a significant and salutary effect on how states resolve a
range of vicarious liability issues under their common law. The same policy arguments that
supported the Court’s articulation of new doctrine for Title VII can apply to determining when
employers should be liable for the common law torts of employees committed outside the
scope of employment but through the use of special opportunities provided to the wrong doing
employee by the employer.125
The Court’s two path breaking decisions on employer liability under Title VII, Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,126 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,127 followed an earlier decision,
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,128 which had stated “Congress wanted courts to look to
agency principles for guidance in this area.”129 Twelve years later the Court considered that
guidance in the Ellerth and Faragher opinions. The two cases were not treated as companions,
but were instead argued separately and were assigned after argument to two different Justices
for majority opinions. The reason for the separate argument and opinions was that the Court
did not grant certiorari in Ellerth on the issue of employer liability for supervisory “hostile work
environment” harassment like the sexual propositions, comments, and touching proven in

124

The lower courts and the EEOC have interpreted the decisions to apply to all forms of discriminatory
harassment covered by Title VII, not just the sexual harassment at issue in those cases. See, e.g., Kang v. U. Lim
America, Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 2002) (national origin discrimination); Wright Simmons v. City of
Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998) (race). See also EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious
Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (June 18, 1999) (Ellerth and Faragher apply to all forms
of Title VII proscribed discriminatory harassment). The lower courts and the EEOC also have applied the decisions
to anti discrimination statutes other than Title VII. See, e.g., Williams v. U.S. Dept. of Lab., Williams v.
Administrative Review Board, 376 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2004) (whistleblower protection provision of Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974); Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 2000) (§ 1981
racial harassment claim); Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher and Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1158 (8th Cir. 1999) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim as well as sex discrimination claim); Wallin v. Minnesota Dept. of
Corrections, 153 F.3d 681, 688 n.7 (8th Cir. 1998) (Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)) (dicta); EEOC
Enforcement Guidance, supra, (holding applies to harassment based on age under ADEA and disability under ADA
as well as Title VII claims).
125
See TAN xxx xxx infra.
126
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
127
524 U.S. 777 (1998).
128
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
129
Id. at 63. The Court also stated that “[w]hile such principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to
Title VII, Congress’ decision to define “employer” to include any “agent” of an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b),
surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be
held responsible.” Id.
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Faragher;130but did so rather to decide whether the harassment alleged in Ellerth, unfulfilled
threats by a supervisor to take retaliatory action against a subordinate who did not respond to
sexual overtures,131 should be classified as “quid pro quo” rather than “hostile work
environment” harassment.132 That may have seemed an important issue because the per
curiam en banc Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision appealed in Ellerth133 accepted the
liability doctrine that had been adopted post Meritor in most circuits – employers are
vicariously liable for quid pro quo harassment, but are liable for hostile work environment
harassment, including that of supervisors, only if they are negligent in their control of the work
place.134
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Ellerth, however, recognizes that the
distinction of quid pro quo from hostile work environment harassment is not expressed in the
statute135 and, more importantly, the ultimate relevance of any possible distinction depends on
the rules governing employer liability: “The question presented on certiorari is whether Ellerth
can state a claim of quid pro quo harassment, but the issue of real concern to the parties is
whether Burlington has vicarious liability for [the supervisor’s] alleged misconduct, rather than
liability limited to its own negligence.”136 Thus, it must have been clear both to Justice Kennedy
and to Justice Souter, who wrote the majority opinion in Faragher, that the same rules on
employer liability must govern both cases, whether or not these rules generate the same

130

For a recounting of the tawdry facts found by the court after a bench trial in Faragher, see 524 U.S. at 780 783.
For the alleged facts considered on a motion for summary judgment in Ellerth, see 524 U.S. 747 749.
132
The precise question on which certiorari was granted was: “May claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment be
stated under title VII when plaintiff employee has neither submitted to sexual advances of alleged harasser nor
suffered any tangible effects of compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment as consequence of
refusal to submit to those advances?” See 522 U.S. 1086 (1998). As stated by the Court in Ellerth, cases based on
“carried out” threats to retaliate if “sexual liberties’ are “denied” “are referred to often as quid pro quo cases.” 524
U.S. at 751.
133
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The Ellerth case was consolidated
with another case involving unfulfilled threats for purposes of en banc consideration.
134
Id. at 495.
135
524 U.S. at 752. Justice Kennedy allowed that the Court in Meritor had “distinguished between quid pro quo
claims and hostile environment claims”, but asserted it did so “to instruct that Title VII is violated by either explicit
or constructive alterations in the terms or conditions of employment and to explain the latter must be severe or
pervasive.” Id.
136
Id. at 753.
131
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results.137 Because neither Justice apparently wanted to defer to the other’s opinion, we have
two separate analyses of the general common law of agency leading to the same reformulation
of that law to govern employer vicarious liability for discriminatory harassment actionable
under Title VII.
The analysis of employer liability in each opinion attempts to reach its conclusion
through an interpretation of general common law as expressed in § 219 of the Restatement
Second of Agency. Revealingly, neither opinion directly acknowledges the suggestion of Judge
Easterbrook, set forth in his dissent from the Court of Appeals decision reviewed in
Ellerth,138that the agency law of the state where the harassment occurred, not some
constructed general common law, should govern.139 Justice Kennedy, quoting Reid, instead
stated that the Court must “rely “on the general common law of agency, rather than on the law
of any particular State, to give meaning to these terms,”140 and focused on the Restatement
Second of Agency as “a useful beginning point for a discussion of general agency principles.”141
Justice Souter began his analysis in his Faragher opinion by parsing the language of §
219 of the Second Restatement of Agency,142 and considered the precedents citing that
language as if he were engaged in an endeavor, jointly with other courts, to find meaning in
that section’s general statement of the law.143 Justice Souter considered whether the principal,
as expressed in § 219(1), that an employer or “master” is “subject to liability for the torts of his
servants while acting in the scope of their employment” might be interpreted free of the
traditional limitation, expressed in § 228(1), that to be within the scope of employment, the
137

For a fuller account of the background of the two cases, including the oral arguments, see Michael C. Harper &
Joan Flynn, The Story of Burlington Industries v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton: Federal Common
Lawmaking for the Modern Age, in Employment Discrimination Stories, 225 (J.W. Friedman, ed.) (2006).
138
123 F.3d at 552.
139
Id. at 556. In her own concurring opinion, Judge Wood also advocated the use of the use of state common law
of agency, in part because of the concerns with vertical uniformity underlying the Erie court’s rejection of federal
common law. See id. at 565, 571.
140
524 U.S. at 754, quoting Community for Creative Non Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989). Justice
Kennedy also was careful to acknowledge that “[t]his is not federal common law in “the strictest sense” … that
amounts, not simply to an interpretation of a federal statute … , but, rather to the judicial ‘creation’ of a special
federal rule of decision,” quoting Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997).
141
Id. at 755.
142
Restatement Second of Agency § 219(1) (1957).
143
See 524 U.S. at 793 796.
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tort must be “actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.”144 This was
significant because in Faragher the apparent supervisors’ pervasive sexual propositions,
posturing, and touching clearly were not “actuated” to serve the City of Boca Raton.145 Justice
Souter’s consideration included a citation of numerous decisions from various jurisdictions
applying common law to treat within the scope of employment reasonably foreseeable activity
related to employment duties even when not motivated to serve the employer.146 Though he
ultimately declined to rest his analysis on a broad interpretation of “scope of employment,” in
part because doing so would also create vicarious employer liability for co worker
harassment,147 Justice Souter suggested that these common law cases might justify making
non negligent employers liable for actionable discriminatory harassment “as one of the costs of
doing business, to be charged to the enterprise rather than the victim.”148
Justice Kennedy in his Ellerth opinion also considered § 219(1) and acknowledged
“instances ... where a supervisor engages in unlawful discrimination with the purpose, mistaken
or otherwise, to serve the employer;”149 and he recognized that the “concept of scope of
employment has not always been construed to require a motive to serve the employer.”150
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy quickly dismissed the concept as a basis for a Title VII liability
rule151 in favor of an attempt to formulate a new rule based on § 219(2)(d).152 This latter
section provides for employer vicarious liability where the “employee purported to act or to
speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was
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Restatement Second of Agency § 228(1) (1957) See 524 U.S. at 793.
The supervisors who harassed Faragher could not have thought that any of their harassment, see 524 U.S. at
780 783, advanced the interests of the City of Boca Raton.
146
Id. at 794 795. These cases included Judge Friendly’s often cited, but questionable, decision in Ira S. Bushey &
Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968), finding the government vicariously liable for the damage
caused by a drunken sailor’s flooding of a dry dock by opening valves for no possible constructive purpose.
147
Id. at 799. Justice Souter stressed that the lower courts had “uniformly” judged “employer liability for co worker
harassment under a negligence standard.” Id. Justice Souter also allowed “there is no reason to suppose that
Congress wished courts to ignore the traditional distinction between acts falling within the scope and acts
amounting to what the older law called frolics or detours from the course of employment. “ Id. at 798.
148
Id.
149
524 U.S. at 757.
150
Id.
151
“The general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment.” Id.
152
Id. at 758 759.
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aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”153 Justice Kennedy
interpreted the phrase after the comma to stand independent of the phrase before “and,” so
that the phrase could apply to the use of an “agency relation” in the absence of a supervisor
purporting to act on behalf of an employer.154 He then limited this broad interpretation by
asserting it requires something more than an employment relationship that affords the
“[p]roximity and regular contact” of a co worker.155 Justice Kennedy further pressed his
interpretation of the last phrase in § 219(2)(d) by asserting, without any direct precedential
support, that the phrase is the basis for finding employers liable – presumably not only under
Title VII, but also under other law

for supervisors taking what he called “tangible”

employment actions, such as a discharge or denial of a raise or a promotion, against
subordinates.156 Justice Kennedy offered two, not fully consistent, ways of defining “tangible,”
one resting on whether it entails a “significant change in employment status”157 and the other
requiring “an official act of the enterprise, a company act,” which “in most cases is documented
in official company records, and may be subject to review by higher level supervisors.”158

153

Restatement Second of Agency § 219(2)(d) (1957).
524 U.S. at 759 760. This may have misconstrued what § 219(2)(d) was intended to mean. The interpretation
renders the scope of employment limitation largely nugatory, or at least superfluous, because almost all torts
resulting from the employment relationship are “aided” by the existence of that relationship, regardless of the
tortfeasor’s independent course of conduct and motivation for committing the torts. The Illustrations in comment
e. to § 219 clarify that the “aided . . . by the existence of the agency relationship” clause, like the apparent
authority clause, was meant to qualify “purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal.” Those Illustrations
indicate that the tortfeasing employee must claim to be speaking or acting with authority delegated from some
principal. In comment a. to § 228 of the Restatement Second of Agency, the placement of the comma after
“principal” makes this intent more clear: “a master may be liable if a servant speaks or acts, purporting to do so on
behalf of his principal, and there is reliance upon his apparent authority or he is aided in accomplishing the tort by
the existence of the agency relation.” See Paula J. Dailey, All in a Day’s Work: Employers’ Vicarious Liability for
Sexual Harassment, 104 W. Va. L. Rev. 517, 550 (2002).
155
524 U.S. at 760.
156
Id. This new interpretation of the “aided in the agency relation” phrase was unnecessary to explain why
employers are always liable for formal employment decisions, such as discharges and demotions, made by agents
with delegated authority to make those decisions in behalf of the employer. Most employers in the modern
economy are legal entities, such as corporations, that act only through human agents with delegated authority to
act for the entity. As reiterated in § 7.04 of the Restatement Third of Agency, the common law has provided that a
“principal is subject to liability to a third party harmed by an agent’s [tortious] conduct when the agent’s conduct is
within the scope of the agent’s actual authority.” Cf. note xxx infra. Furthermore, most discriminatory or
retaliatory formal employment decisions also are made within the scope of the decision maker’s employment in
part to serve the employer.
157
524 U.S. at 761.
158
Id. at 762. The Court effectively adopted the second definition in its later opinion in Pennsylvania State Police v.
Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). In Suders, the Court held that the Faragher Ellerth affirmative defense is available in
154
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Justice Kennedy, however, was not able to explain how the “aided in the agency relation
standard” derived from the general common law expressed in § 219(2)(d) could determine
whether there should be employer liability in cases that do not include tangible employment
actions.159
After setting aside a broad interpretation of the scope of employment standard in his
Faragher opinion, Justice Souter agreed with Justice Kennedy’s treatment of the last phrase in §
219(2)(d) as an independent standard that “provides an appropriate starting point for
determining liability” for discriminatory harassment.160 Justice Souter, however, also did not
find the standard to be satisfactory standing alone to determine employer liability under Title
VII for a supervisor’s misuse of authority. Justice Souter asserted that while a harassing
supervisor may always be assisted in his misconduct to some degree by his authority over
subordinates,161 imposing vicarious liability for all actionable supervisory harassment would be
inconsistent with language in Meritor stating the Court of Appeals in that case had “erred in
concluding that the employers are always automatically liable for harassment by their
supervisors.”162
Both Justices thus felt it necessary to frame a standard for liability that took into
account not only what they could derive from the general common law of agency as expressed

cases where a supervisor’s harassment does not include an official act and is not significant or severe enough to
satisfy the high standard for constructive discharge, a showing of working conditions so intolerable to warrant a
reasonable employee’s resignation. Quoting from Ellerth, the Suders Court stressed that whether a decision is
tangible turns not on severity, but rather on whether it is “an official act of the enterprise, a company act.”
“[T]angible employment actions “fall within the special province of the supervisor,” who “has been empowered by
the company as … [an] agent to make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control.”” Id.
at 144 145, quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. This definition encompasses precisely those acts of the agent that are
within the agent’s scope of authority. See note xxx supra.
159
In Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. XXX (2013) (slip op at 18), the Court nonetheless cited the Ellerth
decision’s distinction of “tangible” employment actions as a basis for limiting the reach of the new vicarious
liability it formulated in Ellerth and Faragher. See note xxx infra.
160
524 U.S. at 802.
161
Id. at 803 04.
162
477 U.S. at 72, quoted in Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804. Justice Kennedy, like Justice Souter, also treated this
statement as a holding of Meritor, binding on the Court as stare decisis. 524 U.S. at 763 764. For the contrary view
that the Meritor decision did not bind the Court from announcing a rule of strict employer liability for all
supervisory harassment, see Michael C. Harper & Joan Flynn, The Story of Burlington Industries v. Ellerth and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton: Federal Common Lawmaking for the Modern Age, in Employment Discrimination
Stories, 225, 254 256 (J.W. Friedman, ed.) (2006).
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in the Restatement Second of Agency, but also Title VII’s “basic policies of encouraging
forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees.” 163 The “primary
objective” of Title VII, Justice Souter asserted, “like that of any statute meant to influence
primary conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm.”164 Such avoidance, in Justice
Souter’s view, could be encouraged by tempering the § 219(2)(d) standard with an affirmative
defense for employers who could establish both their own reasonable efforts to avoid
discriminatory harassment of the sort suffered by an aggrieved employee and the employee’s
failure to make reasonable efforts to avoid that harassment.165 Justice Kennedy agreed that
Congress’ intention “to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and effective
grievance mechanisms” and Title VII’s deterrence goals supported formulation of a two
pronged affirmative defense.166 Each opinion thereby could agree with the same formulation
of doctrine:
“An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable
hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher)
authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, … . The
defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. … No affirmative
defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a
tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable
reassignment.”167

163

524 U.S. at 807; 524 U.S. at 765.
524 U.S. at 806.
165
Id.
166
524 U.S. at 764.
167
524 U.S. at 807; 524 U.S. at 765. For a fuller statement of the joint “holding” of the cases, see note xxx supra.
164
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The fact that this elaborate doctrine, unlike the federal common law pronounced by the
Court in Reid and Clackamas, was acknowledged to be only under the “guidance”168 of the
general common law and ultimately based on statutory policy, does not render the doctrine of
less potential relevance to a general common law making process involving state as well as
federal courts. The Court’s formulation of this doctrine was as much an instance of judicial law
making as the formulation of any doctrine under a federal common law making authority based
on broad jurisdictional grants like that of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act169 or on
an open ended substantive law like that of the Sherman Act.170 Indeed, the Court’s creative
formulation of a new affirmative defense to strict vicarious liability was as much an instance of
law making as the promulgation of a federal legislative regulation through the formal
rulemaking processes required by § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.171 The Court could
not and did not pretend it was simply interpreting what Congress had intended by statutory
language in Title VII that offered no more guidance than a definition of employer to include
“any agent.”172
Furthermore, the new federal common law of Faragher and Ellerth has the same
potentially influential but not controlling relation to state law as did the general common law
that was pronounced under the regime of Swift v. Tyson. Federal anti discrimination
employment law assumes rather than preempts the existence of variant state anti
discrimination law;173 federal law allows the state law to vary as long as it does not directly
conflict with federal law by requiring that which the federal law prohibits.174 State anti

168

See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63, supra note and TAN xxx.
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 301, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000). See, e.g., Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 448 (1957) (interpreting jurisdictional grant over suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization to confer authority to create law governing such suits).
170
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2.
171
5 U.S.C. § 553.
172
“The term “employer” means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceeding calendar
year, and any agent of such a person . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
173
The assumption of parallel state regulation of employment discrimination is manifest in Title VII’s procedural
system, which requires first filing discrimination charges with any state or local authority that has a law covering
the alleged discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 5(c).
174
See California Federal Savings and Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). As the Court in Guerra stressed, id.
at 281 92, § 708 of Title VII provides for the preemption of state laws “only if they actually conflict with federal
169
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discrimination in employment law thus may impose either greater or lesser liability on
employers for discriminatory supervisory harassment than that imposed under Faragher and
Ellerth. State antidiscrimination law, however, often tracks federal law, with state courts
looking to Supreme Court constructions of federal law for guidance. Thus, numerous state
courts have adopted the Faragher Ellerth doctrine for state anti discrimination law statutes.175
The influence of Faragher and Ellerth may derive from a compelling policy rationale for
qualified strict liability that was not fully developed by either Justice Souter or Justice Kennedy.
The Faragher Ellerth affirmative defense qualified employer liability for discriminatory
supervisory harassment encourages the reduction of such harassment by imposing the costs of
the harassment on that party that presumably was in the best position to avoid the harassment
at the lowest costs.176 Doing so provides to that party the incentive to weigh the risk
discounted costs of taking particular avoidance measures against the risk discounted benefits
of those measures. The Faragher Ellerth doctrine reasonably assumes that in most cases the
costs of avoidance are greater for an employee victim of her supervisor’s harassment than for
an employer with authority over that supervisor. The two pronged affirmative defense that
law” by purporting “to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice
under” Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 7.
175
See, e.g., Frieler v. Carlson Marketing Group, 751 N.W.2D 558, 563 (Minn. S. Ct. 2008) (Minnesota anti
discrimination law); Ocana v. American Furniture Co., 135 N.M. 539, 551, 91 P.23d 58, 70 (2004) (New Mexico anti
discrimination law); Bank One, Kentucky v. Murphy, 52 S.W.3d 540, 544 (Ky. 2001) (Kentucky anti discrimination
law); Brentlinger v. Highlights for Children, 142 Ohio App. 3d 25, 32 (2001) (Ohio anti discrimination law); Parker v.
Warren County Utility District, 2 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Tenn. 1999) (Tennessee anti discrimination law); see also
Farmland Foods, Inc. v. Dubuque Human Rights Comm’n, 672 N.W.2d 733, 744 (S.Ct. Iowa 2003) (dicta; Iowa city
ordinance); Boudreaux v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 762 So. 2d 1200, 1205 (La. App. 2000) (Louisiana’s
repealed anti discrimination law); State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 79 P.3d
556 (Cal. 2003) (adopting variation on Faragher/Ellerth as avoidable consequences doctrine under California Fair
Employment and Housing Act). But see Zakrzewska v. New School, 14 N.Y.3d 469, 479 480, 928 N.E.2d 1035, 1039,
902 N.Y.S.2D 838, 842 (Ct. of App. N.Y. 2010) (Fargaher/Ellerth affirmative defense not available under
Administrative Code of City of New York because statutory language covers all exercises of “managerial or
supervisory responsibility”); Pollock v. Wetterau Food Distribution Group, 11 S.W.3d 754, 767 (Mo. Ct. of App.
1999) (applying regulation to make employer strictly liable for supervisory harassment under Missouri law); Myrick
v. GTE Main Street Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 94, 98 (D. Mass. 1999) (relying on College Town v. Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156 (1987)) (under Massachusetts anti discrimination law employer
is strictly liable for supervisory harassment without Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense); Chambers v. Trettco,
Inc., 463 Mich. 297, 307, 614 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Mich. 2000) (declining to adopt Faragher/Ellerth for Michigan anti
discrimination law; plaintiff must prove the employer failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action).
176
This rationale for strict liability where general deterrence is the primary goal of policy derives from the work of
Judge Calabresi. See Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970), esp. chs. 7 and 10; Guido Calabresi & Jon T.
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055 (1972).
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qualifies an employer’s strict liability under the Faragher Ellerth doctrine, however, recognizes
that this assumption cannot be made when it can be shown both that the employer took
reasonable avoidance steps and also that the employee did not.177 This policy rationale also
helps explains the Court’s acceptance of a more forgiving negligence standard to govern
employer liability to an employee who suffers discriminatory harassment from co workers
without delegated authority to affect her work life;178 it is not as likely that an employee victim
would incur greater costs than her employer in avoiding or preventing harassment by co
workers whom she can avoid or report on without fear of reprisal.179

177

For a fuller development of this rationale, see Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title
VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 6 San Diego L. Rev. 101 (1999). See also J. Hoult Verkerke,
Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 Va. L. Rev. 272 (1995).
178
Although the first prong of the Faragher Ellerth affirmative defense articulates a reasonable care standard for
employers to prevent and correct harassment that seems similar to that set by a negligent standard, see 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(d) (employer is negligent if it knew or should have known of harassment and failed to take corrective
action), a negligence standard for employer liability is more forgiving for several reasons. First, the Faragher Ellerth
affirmative defense includes a second prong that conditions the avoidance of employer liability for a supervisor’s
harassment on the employee not taking reasonable avoidance steps, as well as on the employer meeting a
reasonable case standard. Therefore, in cases where the employer did not and could not know of the harassment,
it could still be liable if the employee herself was not negligent. Second, the Faragher Ellerth doctrine provides an
affirmative defense that reverses the burden of proof on to employers. And, third, a negligence approach
presumably requires proof of causation, while causation does not seem to be an element of the affirmative
defense. Indeed, Justice Thomas’s dissent in Faragher, which assumed that a negligence standard should be
applied for the harassment in that case, was based in part on the majority’s failure to consider whether any
deficiencies in Boca Raton’s anti harassment policy and practice led to its lack of knowledge of Faragher being
harassed. See 524 U.S. at 810 811.
179
But see Harper, supra note xxx, at 82 86.
The rationale, however, does not support the Court’s closely divided (5 4) decision in Vance v. Ball State
University, 570 U.S. xxx (2013). That decision limits an employer’s qualified strict vicarious liability to harassment
by supervisors whom “the employer has empowered to take tangible employment actions against the victim,” i.e.,
to effect a “significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”” Slip op. at 9 (quoting
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.) The Vance Court rejected the broader reach of the Faragher Ellerth doctrine advocated by
the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance, which ties “supervisor status to the ability to exercise significant direction over
another’s daily work.” Id., citing EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful
Harassment by Supervisors (1999). Whether or not the Vance majority was correct in claiming that its limitation
provided a much clearer line for judges and juries to apply than did the EEOC standard, see slip op at 21 24, Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent in support of the EEOC approach expressed a better understanding of why supervisors should
be distinguished from co workers for purposes of rules defining employer liability:
“Exposed to a fellow employee’s harassment, one can walk away or tell the offender to “buzz off.” A
supervisor’s slings and arrows, however, are not so easily avoided. An employee who confronts her
harassing supervisor risks, for example, receiving an undesirable or unsafe work assignment or an
unwanted transfer. She may be saddled with an excessive workload or with placement on a shift spanning
hours disruptive of her family life. … A supervisor with authority to control subordinates’ daily work is no
less aided in his harassment than is a supervisor with authority to fire, demote, or transfer.”
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The same policy rationale indicates why the Faragher Ellerth doctrine could influence
the development of state common law just as it has influenced the construction of state anti
discrimination law. In some cases, a supervisor’s harassment of subordinate employees may
constitute an actionable common law tort180 that would expose the harassing supervisor to
liability.181 Employer liability in such cases, however, poses the same doctrinal challenge as that
confronted by the Court in Faragher and Ellerth. Many state courts, especially before the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 first authorized the grant of compensatory damages under Title VII,182 held
employers liable for tortious sexual harassment under a theory of direct liability for negligent
supervision, akin to the negligence standard for employer liability for co worker harassment
actionable under Title VII.183 This theory provides a basis for direct employer liability for
harassment that is not within the scope of employment and thus subject to vicarious liability,
and which also may not be subject to the exclusive remedy provided in workers’ compensation
laws for injuries arising out of as well as within the course of employment.184 The theory,

Ginsburg, J. dissenting (slip op. at 4, 8).
180
See, e.g., Patterson v. Augat Wiring systems, Inc., 944 F.Supp. 1509 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (recognizing harassment
may constitute torts of assault, battery, outrage, or possibly invasion of privacy under Alabama law); GTE
Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999) (recognizing harassment may constitute tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress under Texas law); Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co., 53 FEP Cas. 1039 (D.Utah 1988)
(recognizing harassment may constitute torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery
under Utah law).
181
The lower courts have interpreted the word “agent” in the definition of employer in Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b), to incorporate agency liability principles, but not to render agents subject to direct liability. See, e.g.,
Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1995).
182
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981A. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII only authorized equitable relief. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e 1(g)(1), including back pay and reinstatement. Such equitable relief would not be meaningful to a
victim of sexual harassment who suffered abusive working conditions, but not an adverse “tangible” employment
decision, such as a discharge, demotion, or pay cut, at least unless the working conditions were sufficiently severe
to constitute constructive discharge. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, xxx, xxx (1986) (Marshall, J.
concurring). Providing a meaningful remedy for discriminatory abusive working conditions indeed was one of the
primary impetuses for the 1991 Act. See Michael C. Harper, Eliminating the Need for Caps on Title VII Damage
Awards: The Shield of Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 14 N.Y.U.J. of Leg. & Pub. Pol. 477, 481 483 (2011).
183
See, e.g., Patterson v. Augat Wiring Systems, Inc. 944 F. Supp. 1509 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (applying Alabama law);
Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1348 (10th Cir 1990) (applying Oklahoma law; jury found employer
knew of sexual harassment, but did not act to stop it); Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 486, 493, 575
N.E.2d 428, 431 (1991) (employer “may be independently liable for failing to take corrective action against an
employee who poses a threat of harm to fellow employees”); Cox v. Brazo, 165 Ga. App. 888, 889, 303 S.E.2d 71,
73 (1983) (same).
184
Every jurisdiction in the United States has a workers’ compensation system that provides compensation without
regard to fault for at least physical injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. In all jurisdictions this
compensation provides a remedy that precludes other recovery for the same injuries. See 6 Lex K. Larson, Larson’s
Workers’ Compensation Law 1 100.01 (Matthew Bender ed. 2011). The tort of negligent supervision, however,
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however, requires proof of an employer’s managerial negligence, even in cases like Faragher
and Ellerth where the harassment is inflicted on subordinate employees. In order to expand
employer liability from a direct negligence to a vicarious strict standard,185 courts had to
expand the concept of “scope of employment”186 or of “aided by agency relationship”187
beyond that adopted by either the Second or Third Restatement of Agency or by the Court in
Faragher or Ellerth.188
The Faragher Ellerth doctrine now offers state courts a compromise of qualified
vicarious liability with as strong a rationale for tort liability as for liability under statutory
antidiscrimination law. The issue of employer liability for its supervisors’ actionable torts on
employers remains important even after the Civil Rights Act of 1991’s authorization of

may subject even employers otherwise covered by workers’ compensation to direct liability for the mental or
emotional distress caused by harassment outside the scope of employment. See, e.g., Sisco v. Fabrication
Technologies, Inc., 350 F.Supp. 2d 932, 943 (D. Wyo. 2004); Gerber v. Vincent’s Men’s Hairstyling, Inc., 57 So. 3d
935, 937 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Gasper v. Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Maryland, 183 Md. App. 211, 230, 960 A.2d
1228, 1239 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); Patterson v. Augat Wiring Systems, Inc., supra note xxx; Kerans v. Porter
Paint Co., supra note xxx; Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club, 79 N.C. App. 483, 495, 340 S.E.2d 116, 124 (1986). But
see Peterson v. Arlington Hospitality Staffing, Inc., 276 Wis. 2d 746, 752, 689 N.W.2d 61, 64 (2004); Kostantopoulos
v. Westvaco Corp., 690 A.2d 936, 937 (Del. 1996); Fields v. Cummins Employees Fed. Credit Union, 540 N.E.2d 631,
640 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (all finding preclusion of claims for negligent supervision of harassment).
185
For an explanation of why this is an expansion of employer liability, see note xxx supra.
186
See, e.g., State of Arizona v. Schallock, 189 Ariz. 250, 260, 941 P.2d 1275, 1285 (1997) (sexual assaults by
supervisor at work place, even though not to serve the employer, were “foreseeable” because of employer’s
knowledge and thus within scope of employment). See also TAN xxx xxx and note xxx supra.
187
See, e.g., Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559 (11th Cir. 1987) (Title VII liability); Rauh v.
Coyne, 744 F. Supp. 1186, 1191 (D.D.C. 1990) (employer could be liable for sexual assault by a supervisory manager
because assault was aided by the agency relationship). For discussion of why this treatment of “aided by the
agency relationship” is expansive, see TAN xx xx and notes xx and xx supra.
188
Some courts also found employers directly liable for harassment based torts through expansion of the agency
law concept of ex post authorization or “ratification.” See, e.g., Jones v. B.L. Dev. Corp., 940 So.2d 961, 966 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2006) (doing nothing to reprimand a known employee wrongdoer is ratification); Mardis v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co., 669 So.2d 885, 889 890 (Ala. 1995) (ratification doctrine obviates need to prove employer’s negligence
caused injury); Simon v. Morehouse School of Medicine, 908 F.Supp. 959, 973 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (negligent
supervision constitutes ratification under Georgia law). These decisions equated an employer’s failure to control
known harassment with ratification of that harassment, ignoring the traditional common law requirement that the
agent must have “acted or purported to act as an agent” of the ratifying principal. See Restatement Third of
Agency § 4.03 (“A person may ratify an act if the actor acted or purported to act as an agent on the person’s
behalf.”). See also, e.g., Fretland v. County of Humboldt, 63 Cal. App. 4th 897, 905, 74 Cal. Rptr. 379, 384 (1998)
(“Ratification is the voluntary election by a person to adopt in some manner as his own an act which was
purportedly done on his behalf by another person, the effect of which, as to someone or all persons, is to treat the
act as if originally authorized by him.”) Harassers of course do not typically purport to be acting on behalf of their
employers, even when they use their delegated power to control their victims.
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compensatory damages, not only because those damages are limited by caps,189 but also
because some of those actionable torts may not be discriminatory and thus actionable under an
antidiscrimination statute.190 For instance, a supervisor’s harassment or bullying of subordinate
employees may be sufficiently “extreme and outrageous” to constitute the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress under a state’s substantive tort law,191 regardless of whether the
bullying is in any manner discriminatory.192 If the bullying is not remedial through an exclusive
workers’ compensation remedy, either because it was not within the scope of employment193
or because the resultant severe distress did not derive primarily from a physical injury,194 the
issue of employer liability must be resolved. The argument for resolution of that issue through
the affirmative defense qualified vicarious liability delineated in Faragher and Ellerth is as
strong as it was for Title VII liability for the discriminatory harassment in those cases.
Furthermore, the state’s substantive tort law presumably has as strong a deterrent policy as the
Title VII policy on which Justices Souter and Kennedy purported to rest their new doctrine of
qualified vicarious liability.195
The potential influence on state common law of the Court’s new qualified vicarious
liability doctrine, moreover, may extend well beyond cases brought by subordinate employees.
The doctrine also is well suited to define employer liability for torts inflicted by employees
outside the scope of employment, in part because of the employer’s significant augmentation
189

42 U.S.C. § 1981A(b)(3) (limiting the sum of compensatory and punitive damages to a sum ranging from $50,000
to $300,00, depending on the size of the employer).
190
Harassment of course is only actionable under Title VII if it is discriminatory. See OncaLe v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 81 (1998).
191
See, e.g., GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 907 (1999) (supervisor intentionally
inflicts severe emotional distress by regularly cursing and threatening subordinates with violence).
192
Courts, on the other hand, have found sexual harassment to be severe or pervasive enough to be actionable
under Title VII not sufficiently extreme and outrageous to constitute the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See, e.g., Miner v. Mid Am Door Co., 68 P.3d 212, 223 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002); Hoy v. Angleone, 554 Pa. 134, 152,
720 A.2d 745, 754 (1998).
193
See, e.g., Horodyskyj v. Karanian, 32 P.3d 470, 474 (Colo. 2001) (“in the usual case, injuries resulting from
workplace sexual harassment do not arise out of an employee’s employment for purposes of the Workers’
Compensation Act” of Colorado); Byrd v. Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So.2d 1099 n.7 (Fla. 1989) (sexual
harassment is not covered by Florida’s workers’ compensation act because it does not “arise out of employment”).
194
See, e.g., Sisco v. Fabrication Technologies, Inc., 350 F.Supp. 2d 932, 941 942 (D. Wyo. 2004) (workers’
compensation law covers only mental injuries caused by compensable physical injuries); Kerans v. Porter Paint Co.,
61 Ohio St.3d 486, 489, 575 N.E.2d 428, 431 (1991) (“psychological disturbances arising solely from emotional
stress” are not within workers’ compensation act’s definition of injury).
195
See TAN xxx xxx supra.
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of the employees’ opportunities to commit these torts. Just as employers augment the
opportunities of employees to engage in harassment by investing the employees with
supervisory authority over subordinate employees, so do employers augment opportunities for
intentional torts by the establishment of other subordinate and dependent relationships. These
relationships include those of guards and police with prisoners or other citizens subject to their
authority and weapons, mental health and other medical employees with their patients,
teacher employees with their students, and clerical employees with their parishioners.
Not surprisingly, when employees in positions of power because of such relationships
have abused that power to commit intentional torts, such as sexual or other assaults, some
state courts have fashioned agency doctrine to impose strict vicarious liability on employers.196
They have done so either by expanding the concept of a scope of employment to include at
least “foreseeable” abuses of an employment position197 or by a broad interpretation of the
“aided by the agency relationship” language in § 219(2)(d) of the Restatement Second of
Agency.198 In Doe v. Forrest,199 the Supreme Court of Vermont indeed relied on the Court’s
interpretation of § 219(2)(d) in Farragher and Ellerth to hold a sheriff’s department liable for a
deputy sheriff’s sexual assault of a citizen the deputy had used his authority to isolate.200
Although the Forrest court did not adopt the Faragher Ellerth affirmative defense compromise,
it did openly embrace the Court’s role in influencing the development of common law doctrine:
196

Justice Souter in his Faragher opinion, see 524 U.S. at795 796, cited several of these cases. See, e.g., Primeaux
v. United States, 102 F.3d 1458, 1462 1463 (8th Cir. 1996) (police officer’s sexual assault of stranded motorist);
Mary M. v. Los Angeles, 54 Cal.3d 202, 216 221, 285 Cal. Rptr. 99, 107 111, 814 P.2d 1341, 1349 1352 (1991)
(police officer’s rape of motorist under arrest); Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.12d 344, 348 349 (Alaska
1990) (therapist’s sexual abuse of patient).
197
See, e.g., Plummer v. Center Psychiatrists, Ltd., 476 S.E.2d 172, 174 175 (Va. 1996) (psychologist acted within
scope of employment when his therapy sessions included sexual intercourse with patient); Red Elk v. United
States, 62 F.3d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying South Carolina law; “it was also foreseeable that a male officer
with authority to pick up a teenage girl out alone at night in violation of the curfew might be tempted to violate his
trust”); Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 594 So.2d 571, 573 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (hospital vicariously liable
for nursing assistant’s rape of patient because rape was “reasonably incidental to the performance of his duties”).
198
See, e.g., Doe v. Forrest, 176 Vt. 476, 487 500, 853 A.2d 48 (2004) (sexual assault of deputy sheriff on cashier
working alone at a convenience store); see also West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1997) (for “a male
police officer whose employer has invested him with intimidating authority to deal in private with troubled
teenage girls, his taking advantage of the opportunity … to extract sexual favors … should be sufficiently within the
orbit of his employer conferred powers to bring the doctrine of respondeat superior into play, even though he is
not acting to further the employer’s goals but instead is on a frolic of his own”) (Posner, J.; dicta).
199
176 Vt. 476 (2004).
200
Id. at 500 504.
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It is, of course, the nature of the common law that every appellate decision represents
the development of the common law, and nothing in the Supreme Court decisions
suggests they are not an integral part of that process. Indeed, the resolution of the
dispute over the meaning of § 219(2)(d) in Faragher is exactly the kind of decision that
best defines and develops the common law. No common law court engaged in this
process, and certainly not the highest court of this country, would expect that a
common law decision on one set of facts would have no influence on future decisions
applying the same legal principle to a different factual scenario.201
Most courts, however, have resisted the expansion of employer vicarious liability for
abuses of power by rogue employees other than police officers and prison guards.202 The
Faragher Ellerth doctrine offers a workable compromise for a common law reformulation that
recognizes that employers are usually, but not always, in a better position than are third party
victims to control the abuse of power vested in such employees as teachers, clerics, medical
professionals, and police and security personnel. The same policies of deterrence and avoidable
consequences upon which Justices Souter and Kennedy relied in Faragher and Ellerth could be
invoked by a state court in the adoption of an affirmative defense qualified vicarious employer
liability for torts by their employees on third parties in subordinate or dependent relationships
arising out of the employees’ employment relationship.

201

Id. at 490 n. 3.
See Doe v. Newbury Bible Church, 182 Vt. 174, 933 A.2d 196 (2007) (distinguishing Forrest to decline to apply §
219(2)(d) to pastor’s sexual molestation of minor parishioner); Zsigo v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 475 Mich. 215, 716
N.W.2d 220 (2006) (nursing assistant’s sexual abuse of restrained psychotic patient not within scope of
employment); Graham v. McGrath, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1033 1034 (S.D. Ill. 2005) (applying Illinois law; priest’s
sexual abuse of young parishioner not within scope of employment); John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 48
Cal. 3d 438, 769 P.2d 948, 956 (1989) (declining to impose vicarious liability on school district for teacher’s sexual
assault on student because “teacher’s authority is different in both degree and kind” from “the authority of a
police officer over a motorist”).
202
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IV.
Actionable Employer Retaliation
The Supreme Court through the elaboration of the meaning of federal statutes may
influence the development of general state law, including state common law, even without
purporting to rely on or to modify general common law. It may do so by providing a resolution
for a legal issue posed by a statute that is the same as or at least parallel to an issue posed by
state law. An excellent example is provided by the Court’s interpretation of the anti retaliation
provision in Title VII203 in Burlington Northern v. White.204 In this case the Court defined which
actions of an employer or its agents may be violations of Title VII’s anti retaliation provision if
taken against an employee because of that employee’s involvement in activity protected by the
provision. Although the Court’s definition was only offered as an interpretation of the
particular Title VII provision, the definition provided a possible resolution of a parallel problem
posed not only by anti retaliation provisions in other federal employment statutes, but also by
express and implied anti retaliation provisions in state statutes, and, most significantly for the
general common law of employment, by the public policy tort cause of action now recognized
in some form in most American jurisdictions.205
The Burlington Northern Court interpreted a provision that makes it unlawful “for an
employer to discriminate against” an employee or employment applicant “because he has
opposed any practice” that is otherwise unlawful under Title VII or “because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing” under Title VII.206 The Court stated that the case required it to “characterize how
harmful an act of retaliatory discrimination must be in order to fall within [this] provision’s
203

“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or
applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 3(a).
204
548 U.S. 53 (2006).
205
See TAN and notes xxx xxx infra.
206
42 U.S.C. § 2000e 3(a).
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scope.”207 It did so by adopting language suggested by two Courts of Appeals: “a plaintiff must
show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse,
“which in this context means it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.’””208 The Court explained that determining whether a
reasonable worker would be dissuaded would provide strong protection of Title VII’s rights to
press and support charges of discrimination without imposing burdensome regulation of “those
petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work” and that are not likely to deter
an employee’s invocation of his or her protection against discrimination. The Court also
stressed that while the reasonable employee standard is necessarily objective, it is sufficiently
general to be flexibly applied in the context of variant circumstances, providing the example of
an employee who is responsible for the care of young children being subjected to a schedule
change.209
The Burlington Northern Court’s interpretive law making was fully policy based. It did
not purport to express a general common law default rule, as did the Court in Reid,210
Darden,211 and Clackamas.212 Nor did the analysis purport to build on or modify the common
law, as did the Court in Faragher and Ellerth.213 Yet the persuasive force of the analysis was as
applicable to any protection against employer retaliation as it was to the protection afforded by
the Title VII provision at issue in Burlington Northern. If the Court’s legal formulation struck the
correct policy balance for this provision, it also arguably struck the correct balance for a general
common law default rule to be adopted by federal courts for other federal anti retaliation
207

548 U.S. at 61.
548 U.S. at 68. The Court quoted language from Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006, which
had in turn quoted from Washington v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005).
209
The Court also pronounced in dicta that unlike Title VII’s prohibition of status discrimination, Title VII’s anti
retaliation provision “extends beyond workplace related or employment related retaliatory acts and harm.” 548
U.S. at 67. This pronouncement was superfluous dicta because the employer actions found to be retaliatory in the
case, the reassignment of the plaintiff from forklift duty to standard track laborer tasks and a 37 day suspension
without pay, were both clearly workplace and employment related actions. The pronouncement makes a
difference in a case like Rochon, supra, where the employer was the Federal Bureau of Investigation and its
retaliation took the form of the refusal to follow policy in investigating death threats a federal prisoner made
against the plaintiff.
210
See TAN xx supra.
211
See TAN xx supra.
212
See TAN xxx supra.
213
See TAN xxx supra.
208

47

Federal General Common Law of Employment

guarantees and by state courts for anti retaliation guarantees in state law that do not carry
specific statutory definitions of proscribed retaliatory acts.
There are indeed many such federal and state law guarantees. Most modern federal214
and state,215 and some older,216 statutes that provide protections or minimum benefits to
employees also include provisions that protect employees from retaliation at least for filing
charges or participating in official proceedings to enforce the protections or claim the
benefits.217 Federal and state legislators seem to have appreciated that the securing of an
employee statutory right, like the right to be free of particular forms of status discrimination
secured by Title VII, requires the protection from retaliation of a victim’s invocation of the right.
Furthermore, few anti retaliation provisions in federal and state employment statutes carry
sufficiently limiting definitions of what retaliations might be actionable to obviate the use of a
common default rule like that provided by Burlington Northern.218 Not surprisingly, therefore,
Burlington Northern has provided such a rule not only for federal statutes,219 but also for many
214

See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)((2)(anti retaliation provision of Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA)); 42
U.S.C. § 12203 (anti retaliation provision of Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)); 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (anti
retaliation provision of Employment Retirement Security Act of 1974); 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (anti retaliation provision
of Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (anti retaliation provision of Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)).
215
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41 1464 (2010); Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. § 12940(g),(h) (West 2014); Tex. Lab. code
Ann. § 21.055 (Vern. 2013).
216
See, for instance, the anti retaliation provision of the 1938 enacted Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §
203 et seq. This provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), also covers the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), which was
passed in 1963 as an amendment to the FLSA.
217
Unlike the anti retaliation provision of Title VII, some statutory anti retaliation provisions by their express terms
protect only participation in official proceedings to protect the underlying right. For instance, the FLSA provision,
see note xxx supra, states that it is unlawful for any person
To discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any
complaint or instituted or cause dot be instituted any proceedings under or related to this chapter, or has
testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). In Kasten v. Saint Gobain Performance Plastics, xxx U.S. xxx, 131 S.Ct. 1325 (2011), the Court
held that oral complaints may be protected by this provision, but it left open whether the provision protects a
complaint to an employer rather than to the government.
See also the delineated anti retaliation provision in § 510 of the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 1140.
218
None of the federal statutes cited in note 214 do so.
219
See, e.g, Millea v. Metro North, 658 F.3d 154, 165 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (joining “sister circuits” in applying
Burlington Northern test to anti retaliation provision in FMLA); Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1166 67
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying test to ADA retaliation claim); Nagle v. Village of calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1121 (7th
Cir. 2009) (applying test to ADEA retaliation claim); Ergo v. Int’l Merchants Services, Inc., 519 F.Supp.2d 765 (N.D.
Ill. 2007) (applying test to FLSA retaliation claim).
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state statutes with express anti retaliation provisions that do not define prohibited retaliatory
acts.220
Judges interpreting statutes offering benefits or protections to employees without
inclusion of an express anti retaliation guarantee also have appreciated that such a guarantee is
necessary to meet statutory purposes. Thus, both the Supreme Court221 and the highest courts
of numerous states222 have found anti retaliation guarantees to be implicit in general statutory
provisions. For instance, relying on several decades of precedent,223 the Court in Gomez Perez
v. Potter224 held that the prohibition in § 633a(a) of “discrimination based on age” in personnel
actions in the federal government225 “includes retaliation based on the filing of an age
discrimination complaint,” even though the provision does not refer expressly in any way to
retaliation.226 The lack of any explicit reference to retaliation in § 633a(a) obviously renders the

220

See, e.g., Gossard v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 612 F.Supp.2d 1242, 1252 1253 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (applying
Burlington Northern to retaliation claim under Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. St. §760.10(7)); Swanson v. Minnesota,
2008 WL 4375985 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2008) (applying Burlington Northern standard to anti retaliation provisions of
Minnesota Whistleblower and Occupational Safety and Health Acts, Minn. Stat. §§ 181.932, Subd. 1(a) and 12654,
Subd. 9); Montgomery County v. Park, 246 S.W.3d 610, 614 (Tex. 2007) (“a personnel action is adverse within the
meaning the Whistleblower Act [Tex. Gov’t Code § 554.002] if it would be likely to dissuade a reasonable, similarly
situated worker from making a report under the Act”); Secherest v. Lear Siegler Services, Inc., 2007 WL 1186597
(M.D. Tenn. 2007) (applying Burlington Northern standard to Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4
21 311); Niu v. Revcor Molded Products Co., 206 S.W.3d 723, 731 (Tex. App. Ft. Worth 2006) (applying Burlington
Northern to anti retaliation provision in Texas Labor Code § 21.055 covering employment discrimination). But see
Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 723 (2d Cir. 2010) (stressing that the New York City
Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. code § 8 107(7), makes it illegal to retaliate “in any manner”); Ivan v. County of
Middlesex, 595 F.Supp.2d 425, 470 71 (D.N.J. 2009) (declining to apply Burlington Northern “because the language
of Title VII differs from LAD [New Jersey Law Against Discrimination] as interpreted by New Jersey courts”).
221
See TAN and note xxx infra.
222
See TAN and note xxx infra.
223
The Court relied primarily on Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 326 U.S. 299 (1969) (finding that the
prohibition of race discrimination in property transactions in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 makes cognizable a claim for
retaliation for opposing race discrimination in housing) and Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167
(2005) (implying protection against retaliation for filing a complaint with the government from the prohibition of
gender discrimination in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681). The Court in Jackson
stated that “when a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he complains of sex discrimination, this
constitutes intentional discrimination ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation of Title IX.” Id. at 174.
224
553 U.S. 474 (2008).
225
29 U.S.C.
226
Gomez Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479 (2008). See also CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008),
where the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981’s prohibition of race based employment discrimination in employment
contracts supports a claim of retaliation for opposing such discrimination. Whether the Court’s implication of a
remedy for retaliation in Gomez Perez, CBOCS West, and Jackson, see note xxx supra, in order to ensure fulfillment
of statutory purpose, was an appropriate use of judicial power is beyond the scope of this essay. Justices Thomas
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implied retaliation prohibition in need of some standard, like that provided by Burlington
Northern, to define which employer actions could constitute illegal retaliation.
Similarly, in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,227 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
employees must have a cause of action for retaliation to ensure implementation of the
purposes of the Illinois’s Workmen’s Compensation Act:
“the legislature enacted the workmen’s compensation law as a comprehensive scheme
to provide for efficient and expeditious remedies for injured employees. This scheme
would be seriously undermined if employers were permitted to abuse their power to
terminate by threatening to discharge employees for seeking compensation under the
Act. . . . when faced with such a dilemma many employees, whose common law rights
have been supplanted by the Act, would choose to retain their jobs, and thus, in effect,
would be left without a remedy either common law or statutory. This result . . . is
untenable and is contrary to the public policy as expressed in the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.”228

and Scalia, who claim to reject purpose based statutory interpretations, dissented in all three cases. See 553 U.S.
at xxx; 553 U.S. at xxx; 544 U.S. at xxx.
227
74 Ill.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
228
74 Ill.2d at 181 182. It is not clear but makes no real difference whether the Kelsay court, in the manner of the
Court in Gomez Perez, found the retaliation cause of action to be implied in the Illinois statute or rather purported
to exercise its common law making power in the creation of the retaliation cause of action. A state court, however,
would have to assert its full common law making power in order to create a right of action against retaliation for
asserting a right under a federal law. See, e.g., Flenker v. Williamette Industries, Inc., 2666 Kan. 198, 967 P.2d 295
(1998) (holding that the remedy for retaliation for asserting a right under the federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act does not preclude a state common law cause of action for wrongful discharge for asserting the right).
For a decision more clearly relying on a workers’ compensation statute, rather than general common law making
authority, to imply a cause of action for retaliatory termination, see Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind.
249, 252, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (noting statute states that no “device shall . . . relieve any employer . . . of any
obligation created by this act”). For decisions in other jurisdictions creating or implying a cause of action for
retaliatory termination for the exercise of rights under a worker’s compensation statute, see, e.g., Shick v. Shirey,
716 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 1998); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987); Griess v. Consol.
Freightways, 776 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 1989); Clanton v. Claim Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984); Hansen v.
Harrah’s, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984); Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983). State courts also
have implied rights of action against retaliation for asserting rights under other kinds of employee protection or
benefit statutes. See, e.g., Highhouse v. Avery Transp., 443 Pa. Super. 120, 127, 660 A.2d 1374, 1378 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1995) (right of action against discharge for claiming unemployment compensation); Lara v. Thomas, 512
N.W.2d 777, 782 (Iowa 1994) (right of action against discharge for filing partial unemployment compensation
claim).
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Like the Supreme Court’s implication of a prohibition of retaliation in an anti discrimination
provision in cases like Gomez Perez, a state court’s creation of a cause of action for unlawful
termination in cases like Kelsay without the guidance of any specific statutory directives
requires asking a policy question that was answered generally in Burlington Northern: If
protections against termination are necessary to ensure underlying statutory rights, which
employer actions are sufficiently significant to warrant a cognizable claim?229
Indeed, the potential utility of the general lawmaking in Burlington Northern for state
law is even more significant because of other modifications over the past several decades in the
common law employment at will default principle. That principle of course generally construes
employment for an indefinite term as terminable at the will of either party for any reason.230 It
has been qualified by anti discrimination and other statutes and by the implication of causes of
action like those described above to ensure the protection of employee rights.231 It also has
been qualified in the current era by the creation of other actions for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy. Some of this law making has been fashioned by state legislatures in
statutes protective of whistleblowers.232

229

Although the Illinois Supreme Court declined to extend the retaliatory discharge cause of action it recognized in
Kelsay to a case of retaliatory demotion, see Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, 164 Ill.2d 29, 206 Ill. Dec. 625, 645
N.E.2d 877 (1994), courts in other jurisdictions have expanded the protection of workers’ compensation claimants
to cover other forms of retaliation. For instance, in Trosper v. Bar “N Save, 273 Neb. 855, 734 N.W.2d 704 (2007),
the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that a cause of action for retaliatory demotion exists against an employer that
demotes an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim. In his concurring opinion, Judge Gerrard explained
that “undue interference with the employment relationship” could be avoided by delimiting the cause of action
based on the Burlington Northern definition of materially adverse. Id. at 871. See also, e.g., Robel v. Roundup
Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 49 50, 59 P.3d 611 (2002) (Washington statute that states an employer may not
“discriminate” against an employer for filing a compensation claim may cover retaliatory verbal harassment);
Brigham v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 262 Kan. 12, 20, 935 P.2d 1054 (1997) (“cause of action for retaliatory demotion
is a necessary and logical extension of the cause of action for retaliatory discharge”). Brigham is discussed further
at TAN xxx infra.
230
The employment at will default rule is recognized in all American jurisdictions, except Montana which has
enacted a statute requiring a showing of “good cause” for all terminations of an employee’s employment after the
employee’s completion of a probationary period. See Montana Wrongful Discharge of Employment Act. Mont.
Code §§ 39 2 901 to 914. For a history of the origin of the rule, see Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the
Employment At Will Rule, 20 Amer. J. of Legal Hist. 118 (1976).
231
See TAN xxx xxx supra.
232
See, e.g., Cal.Labor Code § 1102.5; Fla. Stat. § 448.102; Ill. Stat. 430/15 10; Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 15.361 15.368;
Minn. Stat. § 181.932; N.J. Stat. §§ 34:19 1 to §9 8; N. Y. Labor Law art. 20 C § 740; 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 1421 28.
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The primary impetus for the wrongful discharge in violation of public policy cause of
action, however, has come from the judiciary. State courts have exercised their common law
making authority to recognize such actions not only to secure employee rights, as in Kelsay, but
also to serve broader public purposes in cases where a discharged employee is terminated for
performing a public duty defined by law,233 for refusing to commit an act that violates some law
or perhaps code of professional or occupational conduct,234 or for reporting or inquiring about
illegal employer conduct.235
State courts have created such actions for wrongful discharge to serve public policy
defined by other authoritative law or code making bodies.236 They have done so recognizing
that such public policy may be undermined if employees are discouraged by the threat of
discharge from acting in conformity with or to advance the rules set by that policy. Such
recognition, however, poses the question of whether employees should be protected from
retaliation through other forms of discipline, short of termination. If employees can be
discouraged from serving a public interest by the threat of termination, could they also not be
discouraged by a demotion or suspension or pay cut? If a state recognizes some public policy as
sufficiently strong to compromise an employer’s right to define the bounds of the employment
relationship, why not recognize is as sufficiently strong to qualify an employer’s discretion over
discipline short of termination?
233

See, e.g., Texler v. Norfolk S. Ry., 957 F. Supp. 772 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (testifying truthfully at deposition; applying
North Carolina law); Parada v. City of Colon, 29 Cal. Rptr.2d 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (issuing stop orders against
construction projects failing to satisfy permit requirements); Nees v. Hock, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (performance
of jury duty)
234
See, e.g., Hobson v. McLean Hosp. Corp., 522 N.E.2d 975 (Mass. 1988) (refusing to allow supervised nurses to
violate state law in checking patients); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987) (refusing
to pump leaded gas into car built for unleaded gas in violation of federal law); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443 A.2d
728 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (refusing to close pharmacy in violation of state law).
235
See, e.g. Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 616 (W.Va. 2000) (reporting unlicensed practice of
cosmetology to regulating board); Green v. Ralee Eng’g Co., 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998) (reporting to management
about aircraft parts that the employee reasonably believed was illegal); Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d
876 (Ill. 1981) (supplying information about employee theft to law enforcement officers).
236
Some courts have recognized established principles of professional or occupational conduct that have received
judicial or other public sanction as a source of public policy for the wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
tort. See, e.g., LoPresti v. Rutland Regional Health Services, Inc., 865 A.2d 1102 (Vt. 2004) (medical ethical code
may be source of public policy); Rocky Mountain Hosp. and Med. Serv. V. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1996)
(public policy set by Colorado State Board of Accountancy Rules of Professional Conduct); Shearin v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 652 A.2d 578 (Del. Ch. 1994) (attorney’s duty to report wrongdoing of employer under code of ethics
is a basis for public policy).
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A few state courts indeed have understood that recognition of a tort of wrongful
discipline is a logical corollary to the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. As
explained by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Brigham v. Dillon Companies:
To conclude otherwise would be to repudiate this court’s recognition of a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge. The obvious message would be for employers to
demote rather than discharge employees in retaliation for filing a workers
compensation claim or whistleblowing. Thus employers could negate this court’s
decisions recognizing wrongful or retaliatory discharge by taking action falling short of
actual discharge.237
This recognition, however, like the recognition of any action for retaliation, begs the question of
scope for which the Burlington Northern holding supplies a sensible default answer.
This question of scope for a wrongful discipline cause of action was considered in the
drafting of the Restatement Third of Employment Law. Citing decisions like Brigham and noting
that there are “few reported cases [that] involve employees who have not been discharged, or
quit and alleged constructive discharge,” the Restatement Third of Employment in a draft
tentatively approved by the ALI membership in May, 2009, stated a tort of “Employer Discipline
in Violation of Public Policy.” Drawing from Burlington Northern, § 4.01 of that draft covered
“an action short of discharge that is reasonably likely to deter a similarly situated employee
from engaging in protected activity, including an action that significantly affects employee
compensation or working conditions.”238
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262 Kan. 12, 20, 935 P.2d 1054, 1060 (1997). See also, e.g., Powers v. Springfield City Schs., 1998 WL 336782
(Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1998) (claim of wrongful failure to promote for performing duty to report child abuse);
Garcia v. Rockwell Int’l corp., 232 Cal Rptr. 490 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (claim of wrongful suspension and demotion for
revealing mischarging to National Aeronautics and Space Administration); Trosper v. Bag ‘N Save, supra note xxx..
238
Section 4.01(b) of the Restatement Third of Employment Law (Tentative Draft No.2 2009). Section 4.01 of this
draft stated in full:
§ 4.01 Employer Discipline in Violation of Public Policy
(a) An employer that discharges or takes other material adverse action against an employee
because the employee has or will engage in protected activity under §4.02 is subject to
liability in tort for wrongful discipline in violation of public policy, unless the statue or other
law that forms the basis of the applicable public policy precludes tort liability or otherwise
makes inappropriate judicial recognition of a tort claim.
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To be sure, a majority of those courts that have considered expanding the common law
claim of wrongful discharge to include other adverse personnel actions, have declined to do so,
in part because of concern about additional regulation of employers’ personnel discretion.239
Indeed, the final Restatement Third of Employment draft, in deference to this judicial
reluctance to expand the tort of wrongful discharge, does not cover wrongful discipline short of
that which is sufficiently intolerable to warrant a reasonable employee’s resignation, i.e. a
constructive discharge.240 The Burlington Northern test nonetheless remains a useful standard
for any jurisdiction that adopts a comprehensive cause of action for wrongful discipline, either
through judicial or legislative lawmaking.
V.
Vicarious Employer Liability for Punitive Damages
Not all federal law making effected through the interpretation of federal statutes can be
expected to influence the general common law of the states, however. There may be good
reasons why newly formulated legal doctrine announced as an interpretation of a federal
statute will not influence the resolution of parallel issues in state law even when the new
formulation purports to build on or refine the general common law. First, the resolution of the
parallel issues under state common law may be well established in each jurisdiction, even if not
(b) “Other material adverse action” in this Section means an action short of discharge that is
reasonably likely to deter a similarly situated employee from engaging in protected activity,
including an action that significantly affects employee compensation or working conditions.
239
See, e.g., Jewett v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 1997 WL 255093 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997) (not recognizing claim for
retaliatory demotion): Mintz v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int’l, Inc., 183 Ariz. 550, 553, 905 P.2d 559, 562 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1995) (“tort of wrongful failure to promote does not presently exist”); Hindo v. Univ. of Health Scis., 604 N.E.2d
463, 468 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (not recognizing claim for retaliatory demotion).
240
This final draft will be presented to the ALI Membership for final approval in May, 2014. The draft deleted
“other material adverse action” from the black letter, to “reflect[] the majority view of the jurisdictions addressing
the issue.” See comment c. to Section 5.01(b) of the Restatement Third of Employment Law (Council Draft No.11
2013) (in this draft Chapter 4 has become Chapter 5). Comment c. also explained that wrongful discharge “covers
claims for wrongful discharge,” and that “[a]n employer constructively discharges an employee if the employer
creates working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee under the circumstances would be
compelled to quit, and the employee in fact quits.” Id.
This standard for constructive discharge was endorsed by the Court in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,
542 U.S. 129 (2004). See note xxx supra. Courts have recognized that the tort of wrongful discharge would be
without substantial practical meaning if it did not cover employer actions that made continuation of work
intolerable for reasonable employees. See, e.g., Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist., 237 Wisc.2d 19, 66 67, 614 N.W.2d 443
(2000).
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set in the same manner in all. Second, the new formulation may be dependent on a policy
balance made in interpretation of the federal law that is not persuasive to state courts making
different policy balances under their own law. 241
An example of federal judicial employment lawmaking which should not be influential
for these reasons is provided by the Court’s modification in Kolstad v. American Dental
Association242 of the approach of the Restatement Second of Agency243 and of the Restatement
Second of Torts244 (Restatement Rule) to the imposition of punitive damages on employers for
the torts of their agents. After first holding that the Title VII standard of culpability for the
imposition of punitive damages is subjective knowledge of a risk of acting in violation of law,245
the Court in Kolstad also held that employers should not be liable for punitive damages for their
agents’ knowing violation of Title VII, even in cases where the Restatement Rule’s standard of
employer complicity through managerial agents is met, if “the discriminatory employment
decision of [the] managerial agents” were “contrary to the employer’s ‘good faith efforts to
comply with Title VII.”246

The Kolstad Court’s reasons for modifying the Restatement Rule for purposes of Title
VII, though potentially applicable to a general common law rule, were not sufficiently
241

Neither of these reasons seem applicable to the potential federal contributions to the general common law of
employment thus far considered in this article. For instance, the definition of employee has never been fully
crystallized because of the flexibility of the multifactor tests, see TAN xx xx supra, and the exclusion of controlling
owners from this definition only has become salient recently, see TAN xx xx supra. Further, as argued above, the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Clackamas, see TAN xx supra, Faragher Ellerth, see TAN xx xx supra, and Burlington
Northern, see TAN xxx xxx supra, carry persuasive rationales that could influence the development of unsettled
general common law.
242
527 U.S. 526, 545 546 (1999).
243
Section 217C of the Restatement Second of Agency states:
“Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal because of an act by an agent if,
but only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act.
244
Section 909 of the Restatement Second of Torts states the same formulation as that in § 217C of the
Restatement Second of Agency. See note xxx supra. The Restatement Third of Agency, § 7.03 cmt. e, at 156 160,
endorses the approach of § 909, interpreting it to provide that “unless a tortfeasor is a managerial agent, punitive
damages may be awarded only when the culpability of the managerial agent can be shown. Id. at 158.
245
527 U.S. at 535 536.
246
526 U.S. at 545 546.
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persuasive to have a likely salutary effect on the common law of most states. The Restatement
Rule allows punitive damages when the tort committing agent was employed in a managerial
capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or when a managerial agent ratified or
approved the tortious act.247 Justice O’Connor in her opinion for the Kolstad Court expresses
dissatisfaction with basing employer liability for punitive damages on the culpability of some
manager when the employer “himself is personally innocent and therefore liable only
vicariously”248 because he has “undertaken good faith efforts at compliance.”249 Justice
O’Connor’s personalization of employers is a distortion of the reality of the modern economy,
however. Most employers are legal entities that act only through their human agents. It is not
obvious why an employer that employs culpable managerial decision making agents250 should
be described as innocent.
Justice O’Connor also asserted that adopting the Restatement Rule on employer liability
for punitive damages “would reduce the incentive for employers to implement
antidiscrimination programs.”251 This assertion seems illogical. The greater an employer’s
vulnerability to punitive damages, the greater the incentive to implement antidiscrimination
programs to ensure the avoidance of discrimination that could result in onerous damage
awards. Also unconvincing is Justice O’Connor’s suggestion that adoption of the Restatement
Rule, in tandem with the underlying Title VII knowing violation standard for punitive
damages,252 would penalize “those who educate themselves and their employees on Title VII’s
prohibitions.”253 Few officers and decision makers today do not understand the basic anti
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See note xxx supra.
527 U.S at 544, quoting Restatement Second of Torts, § 909, at 468, cmt. b.
249
527 U.S. at 544.
250
As stated in the Restatement Third of Agency, § 7.03 cmt. e, at 159, the determination of whether an agent is a
“managerial agent” “should focus on the agent’s discretion to make decisions that would have prevented the
injury to the plaintiff or that determine policies of the organization relevant to the risk that resulted in the injury.”
251
527 U.S. at 544.
252
This first part of the Kolstad decision confirmed that the “malice” or “reckless indifference” standard for the
grant of punitive damages for Title VII violations, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), “does not require a showing of
egregious or outrageous discrimination independent of the employer’s state of mind,” but “pertain[s] to the
employer’s knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in
discrimination.” 527 U.S. at 535.
253
527 at 544.
248
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discrimination prohibitions of Title VII; effective anti discrimination programs require much
more than education.
Of course providing a maximum incentive to avoid tortious acts is not the only
consideration in setting rules for punitive damages, as it is not the only consideration in setting
any liability rules. More easily available punitive damages can result in inefficient levels of
avoidance, regulation, and litigation, depending on the likelihood of recovery and the level of
damages. Ultimately, setting rules for punitive damages requires a difficult policy balance that
also takes into account the degree to which the substantive law being enforced may carry a
moral condemnation of its intentional, reckless, or even negligent violators. One reason Justice
O’Connor’s “bad faith” overlay on the Restatement Rule likely will not be influential is that she
failed to engage directly with this difficult balancing.
A more important reason that the Kolstad Court’s modification of the Restatement Rule
will not have substantial influence on the general common law is that the states already have
set their own policy balance in variant but well established ways, both by statute and by judicial
decision.254 Unlike the other common law rules discussed in this article, the rules governing
employer punitive liability do not seem open to development or modification toward some
general common law consensus. First, states set different standards for the level of fault
required for the award of punitive damages,255 with a few jurisdictions not allowing any awards
of punitive damages at all in common law actions.256 Of those jurisdictions that do allow such
254

See notes xxx xxx infra.
Some jurisdictions require a conscious desire to injure, while some allow the imposition of punitive damages
based on recklessness or even gross negligence. Compare, e.g., Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 712, 219
P.3d 749, 765 (2009) (punitive damages are available under California Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a), “where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”);
Darcars Motors of silver spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 379 Md. 249, 264, 841 A.2d 828, 837 (2004) (punitive damages
require “actual malice” which is “characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud.”); with Slovinski v.
Elliot, 237 Ill. 2d 51, 58, 927 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (2010) (punitive damages available “when the defendant acts
willfully, or with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others.”) and Phillips v.
Cricket Lighters, 584 Pa. 179, 189, 883 A.2d 439, 446 (2005) (punitive damages are available for “intentional,
willful, wanton or reckless conduct.”) Massachusetts has not accepted the Kolstad culpability standard, see note
xxx supra, even for its own parallel general antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Haddad v. Wal Mart, 455 Ma. 91, 110,
914 N.E.2d 59 (2009) (punitive damages may be awarded when the defendant’s conduct is “outrageous or
egregious”).
256
See, e.g., Haddad, supra, at 110 (“We impose punitive damages only when authorized by statute”); Laramie v.
Stone, 160 N.H. 419, 433, 999 A.2d 262 (N.H. 2010)(“New Hampshire does not have punitive damages.”); Corona
255
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damages, many have set law for employer liability that varies widely from the Restatement
Rule. Some jurisdictions allow the award of punitive damages against employers for torts
committed by employees acting within the scope of their employment with the requisite mens
rea.257 A number of other jurisdictions, in contrast, by statute or judicial decision are more
restrictive of employer liability than is the Restatement Rule.258
To be sure, numerous jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement Rule by statute or
judicial decision.259 But few of those jurisdictions, or others, have been influenced by the
Kolstad modification of the Restatement approach. State court citations of this modification
seem to have been limited to dicta in a few decisions interpreting state statutes.260 Not

de Camargo v. Schon, 278 Neb. 1045, 1053, 776 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Neb. 2009) (punitive damages not recoverable for
any torts); Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank of Tampa, Fla., 96 Wash. 2d 692, 697, 635 P.2d 441, 443 (Wash. 1981)
(“Under the law of this state, punitive damages are not allowed unless expressly authorized by the legislature.”).
257
See, e.g., Bierman v. Aramark Refreshment Services, Inc., 198 P.3d 877, 884 (Okla. 2008); Dewitsky v. Pittson
Lumber and Mfg. Co., 82 Pa. D. & C.4th 18, 22 (Pa.Com.Pl. 2007); Flood ex. rel. Oakley v. Holzwarth, 182 S.W.3d 673
(Mo.App. S.D. 2005); Johannesen v. Salem Hosp., 336 Or. 211, 219, 82 P.3d 139, 142 ()r. 2003); Infinity Products,
Inc. v. Quandt, 775 N.E.2d 1144, 1154 (Ind. App. 2002); Wiper v. Downtown Development Corp. of Tucson, 152
Ariz. 309, 310, 732 P.2d 200, 201 (Ariz. 1987); Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 135, 442 A.2d 966, 970 (Md. 1982).
258
See, e.g., Cavuoti v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 161 N.J. 107, 113, 735 A.2d 548, 551 (1999) (in suit under state
antidiscrimination statute, plaintiff must show “actual participation in or willful indifference to the wrongful
conduct on the part of upper management” and “proof that the offending conduct [is] especially egregious.”);
Loughry v. Lincoln Fist Bank, N.A., 67 N.Y.2d 369, 494 N.E.2d 70, 76, 502 N.Y.S.2d 965, 971 (1988) (“The agent’s
level of responsibility with the entity should be sufficiently high that his participation in the wrongdoing renders
the employer blameworthy, and arouses the ‘institutional conscience’ for corrective action.”); N.C.G.S.A. § 1D
15(c) (North Carolina statute providing: “Punitive damages shall not be awarded against a person solely on the
basis of vicarious liability for the acts or omissions of another. Punitive damages may be awarded against a person
only if that person participated in the conduct constituting the aggravating factor giving rise to the punitive
damages, or if, in the case of a corporation, the officers, directors, or managers of the corporation participated in
or condoned the conduct constituting the aggravating factor giving rise to punitive damages.”)
259
See, e.g., Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Thitchener, 124 Nev. 725, 192 P.3d 243 (Nev. 2008) (applying
Nev.Rev.Stat. 42.007); Boykin v. Perkins Family Restaurant, 2002 WL 4548 (Minn. Spp. 2002) (applying, in
employee’s sexual harassment case, Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 2 (2000)); Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 63
Cal.App.4th 1128, 1150, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 510, 523 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1998) (applying Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(b)); Beriner
v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Iowa 1983); Fitzgerald v. Edelen, 623 P.2d 418, 423 (Colo. App. 1980);
Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus. Co., 61 Ill.2d 31, 36, 330 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1975).
260
Shoucair v. Brown University, 917 A.2d 418, 433 436 (R.I. 2007) (discussing Kolstad in case under Rhode Island’s
Fair Employment Practices Act, but deciding not to impose punitive damages on employer because of Rhode
Island’s own restrictive common law rule on employer liability); (dicta suggesting that Kolstad may have changed
law prospectively under Texas Human Rights Act); White v. Ultamar, Inc., 21 Cal.4th 563, 568, 981 P.2d 944, 948 n.2
(1999) (dicta indicating that Kolstad may have relevance in future cases under California’s statute on corporate
liability for punitive damages, Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(b)). But cf., e.g., Jordan v. Bates Advertising Holdings, Inc., 816
N.Y.S.2d 310, 322 (N.Y. Supp. 2006) (in contrast to Kolstad’s interpretation of federal law, “the New York City
Human Rights Law has made good faith compliance procedures only a factor to be considered in mitigation of
punitive damages, rather than a complete defense”).
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surprisingly, because of the variance of state law261 and the Kolstad decision not providing an
adequate unifying principle, the Restatement Third of Employment Law does not attempt to
restate general common law on the issue of employer liability for punitive damages.
VI.
Conclusion – A Federal State Lawmaking Enterprise
These illustrations demonstrate the potential for federal court participation in a
dynamic general common lawmaking process, one in which federal court lawmaking through
the interpretation of statutes can affect state common law in the same manner as federal
common lawmaking in the age of Swift, through persuasion, rather than in the manner of the
new federal common law under Erie, through command. While the illustrations all highlight the
kind of doctrinal innovations that are likely to persuade state courts only after being
pronounced by the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts also can influence the general
common lawmaking process by contributing to the Court’s new doctrinal formulations. The
Burlington Northern Court’s fashioning of its holding through the adoption of language from
lower court decisions provides an example.262
This interactive general common lawmaking process also can result in the Court
refashioning existing law in the light of state law developments; the Court’s role in the search
for the best law need not always be one of leadership. The Court’s adoption, in Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc.,263 of a cause of action for wrongful death under federal maritime
261

State statutes that cap punitive damages in at least certain actions also provide a special set policy balance
between the deterrent purposes of punitive damages and their economic costs. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. 538.210
(limiting recovery for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions to $350,000); Ga. Code Ann. 51 12 5.1
(1992) (limiting punitive damages outside of products liability to $250,000 unless claimant demonstrates an intent
to harm); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85K (limiting tort liability of certain charitable organizations to $20,000 per
action); Va. Code Ann. 8.01 38 (limiting punitive damages to $350,000). Indeed, the caps on compensatory and
punitive damages set by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see note xxx supra, strike a particular balance for punitive
damages that Justice O’Connor’s modification of the Restatement Rule would seem to upset. Alternatively, a
strong argument can be made that the Kolstad decision’s limitation on punitive damages obviates the continuing
need for the caps on Title VII damages. See Harper, supra note, at 494 496.
262
See TAN and note xxx supra. Indeed, the Labor Board’s role in the development of the “entrepreneurial” test for
employment status, see TAN and notes xxx xxx supra, and the EEOC’s guideline excluding controlling employees
from such status, see TAN and notes xxx xxx supra, both suggest a role for the federal executive branch as well.
263
398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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common law264 provides a clear example of the Court changing federal law to align with new
state law. The Court in Moragne relied in part on the states’ unanimous adoption of wrongful
death actions to overturn its earlier holding in The Harrisburg265 rejecting any action for
wrongful death under federal maritime common law.266 The fact that the legal developments
relied on in Moragne were primarily statutory267 does not make it less relevant to the potential
for state common law influence on federal judicial lawmaking. Justice Harlan’s finely crafted
opinion for the Moragne Court explained why statutory law, like common law developments in
“England,”268 also can express a policy consensus “to be given its appropriate weight not only in
matters of statutory construction but also in those of decisional law.”269
In Moragne the Court exercised the specialized federal common lawmaking authority it
retained after Erie to formulate general maritime law rather than the authority to construe
statutes as in the employment law examples treated in this essay. The distinction between
lawmaking authority outside of a statutory structure, like that for federal maritime or admiralty
law, and lawmaking authority delegated through general statutory provisions, like those
interpreted in this essay’s examples, however, is not important to the potential relevance of
state law. A statutory provision, like that in § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act or
that of the general provisions of the Sherman Act, can provide as much authority to make law
as any constitutional provision. And even more confined statutory authority, like that exercised
in this essay’s examples, must be responsive to considerations of the statute’s purposes in light
of developing public policy.
Recognition of the appropriateness of the Court’s exercise of statutory based lawmaking
authority in response to state law developments does not entail adoption of Judge Calabresi’s
264

Id. at 409.
119 U.S. 199 (1886).
266
398 at 388 392.
267
Indeed, the state law on which the Court relied was exclusively statutory. Id. at 390 (“In the United States, every
state today has enacted a wrongful death statute.”)
268
Id. at 388 89.
269
Justice Harlan drew support from James Landis’s classic article, Statutes and the Sources of Law in Harvard Legal
Essays 213 (1934), reprinted at 2 Harv. J. on Legis. 7 (1965). Justice Harlan, 398 U.S. at 392, quoted Professor
Landis’s conclusion that “much of what is ordinarily regarded as ‘common law’ finds its source in legislative
enactment.” 2 Harv. J. on Legis. at 8. For another insightful exposition of the interaction between statutes and the
common law, see Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 Cath. U.L. Rev. 401 (1967).
265

60

Federal General Common Law of Employment

radical proposal to free courts to reinterpret statutes free of statutory constraints that the
legislature has failed to “update” in response to post enactment developments.270 To varying
degrees, statutes do constrain the law making authority delegated to the courts and executive
agencies. Even when such constraints, in the face of legislative inaction, frustrate the law’s
response to social developments, courts must respect the constitutional prerogatives of
Congress. Such respect, however, does not require ignoring the broad gap filling authority
typically delegated by Congress. Though the delegated authority usually may not be as broad as
that conveyed by § 301 of the LMRA271 or by the Sherman Act,272 few statutes, including
employment statues like Title VII, include language that can or is intended by Congress to
anticipate and answer all doctrinal questions. If a statute is not to be implemented by an
executive agency that is delegated lawmaking authority to fill the statute’s gaps, those
questions must be answered by courts free to consider the answers state courts have provided
to cognate questions.
Some might argue that federal lawmaking in the exercise of statutory authority cannot
be as dynamic as Justice Harlan’s refashioning of maritime law in Moragne because the Court
cannot as readily reinterpret a statutory provision as it can a principle of federal common law
not derived from a statutory source.273 Yet, in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
770,274 the Court overruled one of its most important early interpretations of § 301(a) of the
LMRA275 in light of a different understanding of what could advance “the congressional policy
favoring the voluntary establishment of a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor

270

See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Harvard 1982). Judge Calabresi most succinctly
states his proposal as a “hypothetical doctrine:” “Let us suppose that common law courts have the power to treat
statutes in precicsely the same way that they treat the common law. They can … alter a written law or some part of
it in the same way (and with the same reluctance) in which they can modify or abandon a common law doctrine or
even a whole complex set of interrelated doctrines.” Id. at 82.
271
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
272
15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
273
See, e.g., Levi, supra note xx, at 523 24.
274
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
275
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1970) (holding that the anti injunction provisions of the Norris
LaGuardia Act bar federal court injunctions of a strike in breach of a no strike clause in a collective bargaining
agreement).
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disputes.”276 And the Court, without any Congressional modification of the Sherman Act, has
overruled numerous prior decisions in light of a better understanding of how to serve best the
statute’s goals of benefitting consumers through efficient competition.277 The employment law
doctrines fashioned in the decisions considered in this essay provide as clear examples of
judicial lawmaking as do § 301 or Sherman Act decisions. The employment law decisions, like §
301 or Sherman Act decisions, made law; they did not simply determine what law was made by
Congress. There is thus no reason why these decisions could not be modified in response to a
better understanding of how statutory purposes might be served within intended statutory
constraints, and no reason that innovative decisions by state courts could not contribute to that
understanding.278
The more common flow of influence in modern judicial lawmaking, nonetheless, is likely
to be from the Supreme Court to the state courts. The Supreme Court by virtue of its placement
at the top of the American judicial hierarchy is more likely to influence even when it cannot
command. This essay has attempted to explain through illustrations drawn from recent
employment law developments how the Court retains in an era of statutory law much of the
capability to influence state law that it claimed in the general common law era of Swift.
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398 U.S. at 253. The Boys Market Court held that federal courts can issue injunctions to enforce no strike
clauses in collective bargaining agreements where the enjoined strike is over a grievance subject to arbitration
under the agreement. Id. at 253 254.
277
See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) to
hold that vertical maximum price fixing is not a per se violation of § 1 of Sherman Act); Continental T.V. v. GTE
Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (overruling the per se rule against vertical territorial restraints stated in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
278
For instance, state law decisions refining the distinction between employees and independent contractors could
provide support for the Supreme Court’s ultimate explicit acceptance of the entrepreneurial control test stated in
§ 1.01 of the Restatement of Employment Law Third. See TAN and notes xxx xxx supra.
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